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COUNTING ONCE, COUNTING TWICE:
THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF SUBSIDY
REGULATION
WENTONG ZHENG*
Subsidy regulation is in a precarious state. While it has been so ever
since the conception of the current subsidy regulation regime, the recent
disputes between the United States and China over the "double counting" or
"double remedies" of subsidies have threatened the mere functionality of the
current regime. This Article argues that the double counting controversy
reveals the self-contradictions of the current subsidy regulation regime as to
the fundamental question of why subsidies need to be regulated. These self-
contradictions make it impossible to devise a coherent solution to the double
counting problem within the framework of the current subsidy regulation
regime and sharpen the need for fundamental reforms of the current regime.
This Article puts forward a reform proposal that will solve the double
counting problem and, more importantly, will help restore the intellectual
foundation of the current subsidy regulation regime.
INTRODUCTION ............................................... ....... 428
I. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT SUBSIDY REGULATION REGIME......431
II. GENESIS: THE CONCURRENT APPLICATION OF ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS TO NONMARKET ECONOMIES ............. 435
A. Nonmarket Economies...............................................435
B. Antidumping Duties and NMEs ............................ 435
C. The Applicability of U.S. Countervailing Duty Law to NMEs ................... 436
III. DOUBLE COUNTING: A COMPLEX LEGAL LANDSCAPE ................... 439
A. The Double Counting Hypothesis ........................... 439
B. The Scant Legal Framework Regarding Double Counting...... ..... 440
C. Different Views on Double Counting ........................ 441
1. The Department of Commerce. .......................... 441
2. The Court of International Trade ........................ 443
Assistant Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. The research for this Article
was supported by a summer research grant from the University of Florida Levin College of Law. The
author would like to thank Sungjoon Cho, Jonathan Cohen, Mark Fenster, Simon Lester, Tom Lin,Jason Nance, Bill Page, Danny Sokol, and Michael Wolf for helpful discussions and comments. All
errors are the author's own.
427
49 STAN. J. INT'L L. 427 (2013)
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
3. WTO Dispute Settlement Panel.........................444
4. WTO Appellate Body ............................. 445
5. Federal Circuit ............................... ..... 446
6. Congress ................................... ..... 447
7. The Department of Commerce on Remand ............ ...... 448
8. The Saga Continues ....................................... 449
IV. THE SUBSIDY PASS-THROUGH PRESUMPTION: ECONOMIC FALLACIES............450
A. The Behavioral Impact of Subsidies ..................................451
B. The Price Impact of Subsidies ....................... ...... 455
V. THE SUBSIDY PASS-THROUGH PRESUMPTION: INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES ....458
A. The "Injury" and "Adverse Effects" Requirements: Behavioral Impact
of Subsidies Required ............................. ..... 458
B. The Identification and Measurement of Subsidies: Behavioral Impact of
Subsidies Irrelevant .............................. ...... 461
C. Upstream Subsidies: No Presumption of Subsidy Pass-Through................464
VI. THE CASE FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS OF THE CURRENT SUBSIDY
REGULATION REGIME ...................................... ....... 467
A. The Impossibility of a Coherent Approach to the Double Counting
Controversy .................................... ..... 467
B. Conflicting Rationales for Subsidy Regulation .................. 469
1. The Efficiency Rationale ........................ ..... 469
2. The Entitlement Rationale ........................................470
C. A Renewed Call for a Country-Specific Safeguard...............471
1. The Questionable Case for Subsidy Regulation ......................... 472
2. A Renewed Call for a Country-Specific Safeguard ......... ....... 474
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................... 476
INTRODUCTION
In 1791, in his historic report to the U.S. Congress on the state of
manufacturing in the United States, Alexander Hamilton accused Great Britain of
subsidizing the exportation of certain products and proposed to impose special
duties on those products to countervail the British subsidies.' Approximately a
century later, in 1890, Congress adopted Hamilton's idea by enacting the first
I Among others, Hamilton recommended that Congress raise the import duties on sail cloth to
ten percent because a subsidy (or what he called a "bounty") of two pence sterling per ell was allowed
in Great Britain. Hamilton also recommended that Congress raise the import duties on certain linen
products to seven and one-half percent because Great Britain was giving a bounty of twelve and one-
half percent, on average, on the exportation of such products. These linen products included
"[d]rillings, osnaburghs, ticklenburghs, dowlas, canvas, brown rolls, bagging, and all other lines the
first cost of which at the place of exportation does not exceed 35 cents per yard." See ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SUBJECT
OF MANUFACTURES, PRESENTED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON DEC. 5, 1791, at 50 (Childs
& Swaine 1791).
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countervailing duty legislation in the world2 to offset subsidies conferred by several
continental European countries on the exportation of beet sugar.
Fast-forwarding another century, since the early 2000s, the United States
has been embroiled in a series of high-stakes disputes with China over each other's
subsidy practices. Since November 2006, the United States has initiated
investigations into Chinese subsidies for thirty-one categories of products,
including steel, tires, paper, solar panels and wind towers, and imposed
countervailing duties to offset most of them.4 In retaliation, China launched
investigations into U.S. subsidies for four categories of products: electrical steel,
chicken, automobiles, and solar-grade polysilicon, and imposed countervailing
duties for three of them.' On September 17, 2012, the United States and China
escalated their subsidy disputes by filing a complaint against each other at the
World Trade Organization (WTO).'
The latest subsidy disputes between the two largest economies in the world
are taking place against the backdrop of heightened concerns about jobs and
economic growth in the wake of the 2008-2009 global financial crises.' The
political significance of the issue was on vivid display when President Barack
Obama, on the same day as the United States brought its WTO action against
China, told a campaign rally in Ohio that "[the Chinese subsidies] are subsidies that
directly harm working men and women on the assembly lines in Ohio and Michigan
and across the Midwest."' Referring to the Chinese subsidies, President Obama
2 See 30 CONG. REC. 2203 (1897) (remarks of Sen. Gray) (discussing the Wilson Bill of 1894).
This legislation was the first countervailing duty provision in the world although the first general
countervailing duty law for any and all subsidized imports would not be enacted until two years later in
1892 by Belgium. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW THE GATT AFFECTS U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING-DUTY POLICY 22 (1994).
These continental European countries were France, Germany, Russia, Holland, and Belgium.
See Leo C. Polopolus, World Sugar Markets and Entangled Government Programs, in SUGAR AND
RELATED SWEETENER MARKETS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (A. Schmitz et al. eds., 2002).
4 The thirty-one categories of products are coated free sheet paper, circular welded carbon
quality steel pipes, light-walled rectangular pipes and tubes, laminated woven sacks, new pneumatic
off-the-road tires, raw flexible magnets, lightweight thermal paper, sodium nitrite, circular welded
austenitic stainless pressure pipes, circular welded carbon quality steel line pipes, citric acid and certain
citrate salts, tow behind lawn groomers, kitchen appliance shelving and racks, oil country tubular
goods, prestressed concrete steel wire strand, steel grating, wire decking, narrow woven ribbons with
woven selvedge, magnesia carbon bricks, seamless carbon and alloy steel pipes, coated paper for print
graphics, potassium phosphate salts, drill pipes, aluminum extrusions, multilayered wood flooring, steel
wheels, galvanized steel wires, high pressure steel cylinders, crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (solar
panels), utility scale wind towers, and drawn stainless steel sinks. See Request for Consultations by
China, United States-Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China,
Apps. A & B, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 2012). These subsidy investigations were conducted in parallel
with antidumping investigations aimed at combating lowly priced imports. See id.
See U.S. Products Subject to Foreign Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Measures-China, IMPORT ADMIN., http://ia.ita.doc.gov/trcs/foreignadcvd/china.html (last updated
May 31, 2013).
6 See Jeff Mason & Tom Miles, US. Launches Auto Case Against China, Be~iing Fires Back,
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/17/us-obama-trade-
idUSBRE88GO2420120917.
The unemployment rate in the United States almost doubled during the so-called "Great
Recession," leaping from 5.0 percent in December 2007 to 9.5 percent in June 2009. U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, THE RECESSION OF 2007-2009, at 2 (2012), available at
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession-bls-spotlight.pdf.
Mason & Miles, supra note 6.
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vowed that "[w]e are going to stop it. It is not right, it is against the rules, and we
will not let it stand."9
Despite the clear-cut case made for subsidy regulation in the political
discourse, the intellectual case for subsidy regulation has been much less clear.
From an economic point of view, some subsidies are considered good and some are
considered bad.o Some subsidies affect the interest of producers in other countries
and some do not." Indeed, scholars have long debated the proper rationales for
subsidy regulation and the extent to which the current subsidy regulation regime
reflects those rationales. 2
The weak intellectual foundation of the current subsidy regulation regime
has resurfaced in the current U.S.-China subsidy disputes, to the point of
threatening the functionality of the regime. One of the most contentious issues in
the U.S.-China subsidy disputes is whether, because of the status of China as a
"nonmarket economy,"' 3 the same Chinese subsidies are being counted or remedied
not once, but twice, by the United States. Since 2006, in what has become a legal
drama full of suspense and intrigue, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S.
Court of International Trade, a Dispute Settlement Panel and the Appellate Body of
the WTO, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the U.S. Congress
have each weighed in on the so-called "double counting" or "double remedies"
9 Id
'o See infra Part VI.B.l.
' See infra Part IV.A.
12 See Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting
International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REv. 831 (1972) (advocating a subsidy standard that would limit the
use of subsidies only when they distort market and reduce economic efficiency); John J. Barcelo III,
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779
(1977) (proposing a subsidy regulation scheme based on free trade and economic efficiency); Warren F.
Schwartz, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: Countervailing Duties and the Regulation of
International Trade, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 297 (1978) (arguing that the imposition of countervailing
duties cannot be justified on economy efficiency grounds); Charles J. Goetz, Lloyd Granet & Warren F.
Schwartz, The Meaning of "Subsidy" and "Injury" in the Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT'L REV. L &
EcON. 17 (1986) (proposing an entitlement rationale for subsidy regulation); Richard Diamond,
Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 786 (1989) [hereinafter
Diamond, Economic Foundations] (refining the entitlement rationale for subsidy regulation and arguing
that the proper purpose of subsidy regulation is to insulate domestic producers from the effects of
foreign subsidies); Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the
Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 507 (1989)
[hereinafter Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles] (examining the extent to which U.S.
statutes and case law reflect the entitlement rationale for subsidy regulation); Alan 0. Sykes,
Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1989) [hereinafter
Sykes, An Economic Perspective] (rejecting the efficiency justification for countervailing duties and
advocating the abolition of countervailing duty law); Alan 0. Sykes, Second-Best Countervailing Duty
Policy: A Critique of the Entitlement Approach, 21 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 699 (1989) [hereinafter
Sykes, A Critique] (critiquing the entitlement rationale for subsidy regulation from the perspective of
economic efficiency); Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of
Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Zheng, Market Benchmark]
(critiquing the efficiency justification for the use of market benchmarks in countervailing duty law);
Alan 0. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidy Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 473 (2010) [hereinafter Sykes, Questionable Case] (critiquing the economic justifications
for subsidy regulation under World Trade Organization and European Union laws); Simon Lester, The
Problem of Subsidies as a Means of Protectionism: Lessons from the WTO EC-Aircraft Case, 12
MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 1 (2011) (arguing that a possible purpose of international regulation of
subsidies is to fight protectionist subsidies).
1 For discussions of the designation of the nonmarket economy status, see infra Part II.A.
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issue. 4  Yet six years into the litigation, a satisfactory solution to the double
counting conundrum has eluded the administrative, judicial, legislative, and dispute
settlement bodies that have examined the issue. With the dispute heading into new
rounds of briefings and rulings both domestically and internationally," a protracted
legal battle over the issue appears to be only beginning.
This Article argues that the double counting issue implicates the very core
of the current subsidy regulation regime and brings to the forefront long-running
debates over the justifications for regulating subsidies. 6 This Article contends that
the double counting analyses by both sides of the dispute are misguided, as they are
based on a theoretical premise that is both economically false and internally
inconsistent. More importantly, this Article demonstrates that the double counting
issue reveals the self-contradictions of the current subsidy regulation regime as to
the behavioral impact of subsidies and adds urgency to the need for a systemic
overhaul of the regime. It is as if engineers had tried all possible means to fix a
crack on the walls of a building, only to find that the crack was caused by
foundational problems and could not be fixed without tearing down the building
altogether. This Article scrutinizes the foundational problems of the current
subsidy regulation regime and proposes a blueprint for fundamental reforms of the
regime.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the current
subsidy regulation regime. Part II examines the origin of the double counting
controversy. Part III discusses the double counting hypothesis and the different
views on double counting on the part of the various bodies involved in the dispute.
Part IV demonstrates that the theoretical presumption thought to give rise to the
double counting issue-the subsidy pass-through presumption-is wrong from an
economic point of view. Part V argues that the current subsidy regulation regime is
internally inconsistent as to the behavioral and price impacts of subsidies. Part VI
makes the case for fundamental reforms of the current subsidy regulation regime
and proposes to replace countervailing duties with a country-specific safeguard.
Part VII concludes.
I. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT SUBSIDY REGULATION REGIME
U.S. law has taken an essentially laissez-faire approach to subsidies
granted by domestic authorities." At the federal level, the U.S. Constitution grants
to Congress the power to tax and spend "for the general Welfare of the United
States."' This power has been broadly construed to allow Congress to "authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes not limited by the direct grant of
legislative power found in the Constitution."'9 As for state subsidies, the Supreme
14 See infra Part IIC.
See infra Part III.C.8.
See sources cited in supra note 12.
'7 See Sykes, Questionable Case, supra note 12, at 477-79.
18 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). In Butler the Supreme Court struck down a
federal earmarked-tax-and-subsidy scheme, but that was because the Supreme Court believed that
Congress in adopting the scheme invaded reserved state powers, not because the Supreme Court
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Court has invalidated discriminatory state taxes on out-of-state products on
"Dormant Commerce Clause" grounds,20 but has held that state subsidies that do not
resemble discriminatory taxes are permissible.21
In contrast to the lax regulation of domestic subsidies, the use of subsidies
has been subject to stringent disciplines in international trade. The imposition of
countervailing duties to offset the effect of foreign subsidies was first authorized in
the United States in 1890 for one specific product-beet sugar,22 and was soon
made generally available, under the Tariff Act of 1897, for all products that
benefited from foreign subsidies aimed at encouraging exports.23 The Tariff Act of
1922 further expanded the scope of countervailing duties to cover not just foreign
export subsidies, but also foreign domestic subsidies, i.e., foreign subsidies aimed
at encouraging the domestic production, manufacture, or distribution of
merchandise in countries in which the subsidies are granted.2 4 In 1930, the basic
statutory framework of what is known today as countervailing duty law took shape
under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.25 These early countervailing duty
statutes all used the term "bounty or grant" to refer to subsidies, but left that term
undefined.26
In 1947, the imposition of countervailing duties was brought under
multilateral discipline upon the entry into force of the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).27 Specifically, under Article VI of GATT 1947, GATT
signatory countries are allowed to impose countervailing duties on an imported
product, but are not allowed to levy countervailing duties "in excess of an amount
equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly
or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of such product in the
country of origin or exportation . . . ." 28 But like the earlier U.S. countervailing
duty statutes, GATT 1947 still left the term "bounty or subsidy" undefined.29
The fledgling subsidy regulation regime under GATT 1947 underwent
significant changes in the late 1970s when GATT signatory countries negotiated
believed that Congress could not tax and spend for the general welfare. See Ruth Mason, Federalism
and the Taxing Power, 99 CAL. L. REV. 975, 1000 (2011).
20 See generally JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION $1
4.01-26 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2009) (discussing the Supreme Court's decisions under the Dormant
Commerce Clause in cases involving state taxation).
21 See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1986) ("Direct
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the Commerce Clause];
discriminatory taxation of out-of-state commerce does."). See generally Sykes, Questionable Case,
supra note 12, at 478 (describing the treatment of state subsidies under federal constitutional law); I
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1093, 1149 (3d ed. 2000) (indicating that
direct state subsidies are apparently constitutional).
22 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
23 See Tariff Act of I897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205.
24 See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 935. See also S. REP. No. 67-595, 2d
Sess. 250-51 (1922).
25 See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
26 See Zheng, Market Benchmark, supra note 12, at 8-9.
27 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947].
28 Id. art. VI:3. See also J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 298 (2d ed. 1986).
29 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JOANNA SHELTON ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 12-13 (1984).
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and concluded a Subsidies Code as part of the GATT Tokyo round negotiations.30
The Subsidies Code placed additional limitations on the ability of GATT signatory
countries to levy countervailing duties by requiring a demonstration of the "injury"
of subsidized imports before countervailing duties could be applied.3' The
Subsidies Code also took a significant step forward in the direct regulation of
subsidies: It prohibited the use of export subsidies for all products other than
certain primary products,32 and authorized GATT signatory countries to initiate
dispute settlement proceedings against export subsidies before the GATT."
Recognizing the social and economic goals that domestic subsidies may promote,34
the Subsidies Code stopped short of placing an outright ban on the use of domestic
subsidies as it did in the case of export subsidies. It did, however, authorize a
GATT signatory country to challenge a domestic subsidy directly before the GATT
if the subsidy causes "injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment of
benefits accruing to it under the General Agreement, or serious prejudice to its
,,36 lkinterests. But like GATT 1947, the Subsidies Code did not define the term
"subsidy,"" other than providing illustrative examples of both export subsidies"
and domestic subsidies.
The watershed moment in subsidy regulation came in 1994, when the
GATT Uruguay round negotiations led to the establishment of the WTO. 40 The
30 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XVIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
Id. art. 4.4.
32 Id. art. 9.1.
3 See id art. 12.1 (providing that GATT signatory countries may request consultations with
other signatory countries that grant or maintain export subsidies); id. art. 13.1 (providing that GATT
signatory countries may refer disputes over export subsidies to the GATT Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures if a mutually acceptable solution has not been reached within thirty days of a
request for consultations); id art. 13.3 (providing that the GATT Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures shall review, upon request, a dispute over subsidies in accordance with the
GATT dispute settlement procedures if it is not resolved as a result of consultations or conciliations).
34 See id. art. I 1.1. Note that the Subsidies Code did not use the term "domestic subsidies";
instead, it referred to "subsidies other than export subsidies." See id.
3s The Subsidies Code only urged GATT signatories to "seek" to avoid causing adverse effects
to trading partners when using domestic subsidies. See id art. 11.2.
36 Id. art. 12.3. (providing that GATT signatory countries may request consultations with other
signatory countries that grant or maintain domestic subsidies); see also id. art. 13.2 (providing that
GATT signatory countries may refer to the GATT Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures disputes over domestic subsidies if a mutually acceptable solution has not been reached
within sixty days of a request for consultations); id art. 13.3 (providing that the GATT Committee on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures shall review, upon request, a dispute over subsidies in
accordance with the GATT dispute settlement procedures if it is not resolved as a result of
consultations or conciliations).
37 See Zheng, Market Benchmark, supra note 12, at 9-10.
3 See Subsidies Code, supra note 30, Annex: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies. For
examples of domestic subsidies, see id. arts. 11.1, 11.3.
39 Id. art. 11(3). The examples of domestic subsidies listed in Article 11(3) of the Subsidies Code
include government financing of commercial enterprises, including grants, loans or guarantees;
government provision or government financed provision of utility, supply distribution and other
operational or support services or facilities; government financing of research and development
programs; fiscal incentives; and government subscription to, or provision of, equity capital. Id
4o See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
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WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement),4 1
one of the agreements concluded upon the establishment of the WTO, laid out the
framework of the current multilateral subsidy regulation regime. One of the most
significant developments under the SCM Agreement is that it provides, for the first
time, a definition of the term "subsidy."42 Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy
exists if three criteria are met: First, there is a "financial contribution" by a
government or public body;43 second, a benefit is thereby conferred;" and third, the
subsidy is "specific to an enterprise or industry or a group of enterprises or
industries."45
As for the mechanisms for subsidy regulation, the SCM Agreement
inherited the Subsidies Code's two-pronged approach. The first prong allows WTO
members to levy countervailing duties on subsidized imports, subject to restrictions
imposed by the SCM Agreement.46 As in the case of the Subsidies Code, the SCM
Agreement requires a demonstration of "injury" before countervailing duties could
be applied.47 This prong, which relies on the unilateral imposition of countervailing
duties, will be referred to as the "unilateral prong" or the "countervailing duty
prong" in this Article. The second prong of the subsidy regulation regime under the
SCM Agreement is the direct regulation of certain subsidies. In this regard, the
SCM Agreement distinguishes export subsidies, which are subject to an outright
ban,48 from domestic subsidies, which are impermissible only if they cause "adverse
effects" to the interests of other WTO members through "injury to the domestic
industry of another [WTO] Member, nullification or impairment of benefits
accruing directly or indirectly to other [WTO] members under GATT 1994 . . . ,
[or] serious prejudice to the interests of another [WTO] member."4 9 For both export
and domestic subsidies, the SCM Agreement authorizes WTO members to initiate
dispute settlement proceedings before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.o This
prong will be referred to in this Article as the "multilateral prong" or the "WTO
prong."
4 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 33 1.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
42 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODs 532 (2d ed. 2012).
43 SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1).
4 Id. art. 1.1(b).
45 Id. art. 2.1.
46 See id. pt. V.
47 See id. art. 15. The term "injury" under the SCM Agreement means "material injury to a
domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the
establishment of such an industry." Id. art. 15 n.45.
48 See id. art. 3.1(a).
49 Id. art. 5.
50 See id. art. 4 (providing for dispute settlement procedures for disputes regarding export
subsidies); id. art. 7 (providing for dispute settlement procedures for disputes regarding actionable
subsidies).
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II. GENESIS: THE CONCURRENT APPLICATION OF ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS TO NONMARKET ECONOMIES
To understand what the double counting issue is and why it reveals the
fundamental vulnerabilities of the current subsidy regulation regime, a discussion of
the developments leading up to the emergence of the issue is in order. As this
Article will explain, the root cause of the double counting controversy can be traced
back to the concurrent application of antidumping and countervailing duties to
imports from the so-called "nonmarket economies."
A. Nonmarket Economies
Under U.S. law, a nonmarket economy (NME)" is defined as "any foreign
country that the administering authority determines does not operate on market
principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country
do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise."52 U.S. law authorizes the U.S.
Department of Commerce (DOC) to conduct NME determinations. 3 U.S. law
requires consideration of several factors in determining whether a country should be
designated as an NME, including the convertibility of currency, the determination
of wages by free bargaining, government restrictions on foreign investment,
government ownership or control of the means of production, and government
control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of
the enterprises.54 Once a country is designated as an NME, that designation remains
in effect until revoked by the DOC."
B. Antidumping Duties and NMEs
The question of how the United States should handle cheap imports from
NMEs was first addressed under antidumping law. By way of background, U.S.
antidumping law subjects imports from foreign countries to potential antidumping
duties if they are being sold or are likely to be sold in the United States at less than
their "fair value" 6 and if they cause or threaten to cause material injury to a
domestic industry or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry." In
determining whether imports are being sold or are likely to be sold at less than their
s The U.S. government, in various contexts, has used several terms to refer to nonmarket
economies. These terms include "nonmarket economies," "state controlled economies," and "countries
dominated or controlled by communism." See William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An
Examination of the Application of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States
to China and Other "Nonmarket Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 79, 80 n.9 (1987).
52 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A)(2011).
Id. § 1677(1) (defining "administering authority" as "the Secretary of Commerce, or any
other officer of the United States to whom the responsibility for carrying out the duties of the
administering authority under [the countervailing and antidumping duty statutes] are transferred by
law").
54 Id § 1677(18)(B). In addition to these factors, the Tariff Act of 1930 also authorizes the
consideration of "other factors as the administering authority considers appropriate." Id.
Id. § 1677(18)(C)(i).
s Id. § 1673(1).
1 Id. § 1673(2).
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fair value, the DOC, the agency charged with antidumping determinations, makes
a "fair comparison" between the prices at which imports are sold in the United
States and their "normal value."5 9  In cases involving imports from market
economies, the "normal value" of imported merchandise is the sale price of the
foreign like product in the exporting country or in third countries,6 or the
"constructed value" of the imported merchandise defined as the sum of the costs,
expenses, and profits in producing the imported merchandise.6
For imports from NMEs, however, U.S. antidumping law uses prices from
third countries instead of prices from NMEs to determine normal value. Codifying
DOC practices in the 1960s in antidumping cases concerning imports from certain
Eastern European countries, the Trade Act of 1974 enacted a special surrogate
country method for determining the "normal value" (or "foreign market value," the
statutory term then used for "normal value") of imports from NMEs.62 Under the
Trade Act of 1974, the DOC was authorized to substitute either the prices of the
same or similar merchandise sold in a "non-state-controlled economy" or the
constructed value of the same or similar merchandise in a non-state-controlled
economy for the home or third-country market price of the NME merchandise."
The rationale for the surrogate country method, as stated in the legislative history of
the Trade Act of 1974, was that in state-controlled economies, "the supply and
demand forces do not operate to produce prices, either in the home market or in
third countries, which can be relied upon for comparison."" The 1988 Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act modified the surrogate country method, requiring
the foreign market value of NME merchandise to be calculated solely on the basis
of the value in a surrogate market economy of the factors of production utilized in
producing the merchandise, plus expenses and profits. Those factors of
production include, but are not limited to, labor, raw materials, energy and other
utilities, and capital.66
C. The Applicability of U.S. Countervailing Duty Law to NMEs
While providing a special methodology for imports from NMEs under the
antidumping law, Congress did not enact any special legislation on the application
of the countervailing duty law to NMEs. In the early 1980s, domestic industries in
the United States began petitioning for the imposition of countervailing duties on
5 The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 transferred the responsibility for administering
antidumping and countervailing duty laws from the Treasury Department to the Department of
Commerce. See Pietro S. Nivola, Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field, in A QUESTION OF
BALANCE: THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 201, 230 (Thomas E. Mann ed.,
1990).
59 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (2011).
' Id. § 1677b(a)(1).
61 Id. § 1677b(a)(4), (e).
62 See Comment, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Polish Golf Cart Case
and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 223-24 (1979).
63 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, § 321(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 2046-48 (1975)
(codified as 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b)(c)(1982)).
6 S. Rep. No. 93-1298 § 174 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7311.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(b)(c)(1) (1988).
66 Id § 1677(b)(c)(3).
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imports from NMEs." The DOC, the agency also charged with countervailing duty
determinations," blocked these initial efforts. In a decision issued in the first batch
of countervailing duty investigations on NME imports, the DOC determined that
the countervailing duty law did not apply to NMEs because bounties or grants-the
statutory terms then used for subsidies-could not be identified in such
economies.i In the course of making this determination, the DOC defined a
subsidy as "any action that distorts or subverts the market process and results in a
misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient production and lessening world
wealth.""o Because allocation of resources is achieved in an NME by central
planning, not by supply and demand, there is "no market process to distort or
subvert" in such economy." This distinction led the DOC to conclude that
"subsidies have no meaning outside of the context of a market economy." 72
In a landmark opinion, Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 3 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the DOC's refusal to apply the
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs. According to the court, there was a
fundamental difference between the nature of a subsidy in a market economy and
the nature of economic incentives provided by the state to exporting entities in an
NME. Since the state controlled the pricing decisions of the exporting entities in an
NME, "unlike the situation in a competitive market economy, the economic
incentives the state provided to the exporting entities did not enable those entities to
make sales to the United States that they otherwise might not have made." 74 The
governments of NMEs, therefore, could not provide exporters with the kind of
bounty or grant for which Congress prescribed the imposition of countervailing
duties.7s
Despite the Federal Circuit's opinion in Georgetown Steel, petitioners
continued their efforts to reverse the DOC's policy of not applying the
countervailing duty law to imports from NMEs. In November 2006, petitioners
filed a request for countervailing duty investigation on imports of coated free sheet
67 In 1983, the DOC initiated the first countervailing duty investigation against imports from a
nonmarket economy in a case involving textiles and apparel products from China. See Textiles,
Apparel, and Related Products from the People's Republic of China, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,600 (Dep't of
Commerce Oct. 13, 1983) (initiation of countervailing duty investigation). The petitioners in that case
later withdrew their petition. See Industry, Commerce Agree to Delay Decision on Chinese Textiles
CVD Case, 9 U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) No. 10, at 373 (Dec. 7, 1983). In the same year, the DOC
initiated countervailing duty investigations against certain steel products from Poland and
Czechoslovakia. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (Dep't of Commerce
Dec. 21, 1983) (initiation of countervailing duty investigation); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Czechoslovakia, 48 Fed. Reg. 56,419 (Dep't of Commerce Dec. 21, 1983) (initiation of countervailing
duty investigation).
68 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
69 Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19,374 (Dep't of Commerce May
7, 1984) (final negative countervailing duty determination) [hereinafter Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Poland].
70 Id. at 19,375.
7' Id.
72 id
" 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
74 Id. at 1315-16.
7s Id. at 1316.
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(CFS) paper from China. In March 2007, the DOC published a memorandum
discussing whether the analytical elements of the Federal Circuit's Georgetown
Steel opinion are still applicable to China's present-day economy.1 The DOC
pointed out in the memorandum, referred to as the Georgetown Steel Memo below,
that China's economy today is "significantly different" from the "Soviet-style"
economies of the early 1980s that were at issue in Georgetown Steel.7 ' The DOC
noted that unlike the Soviet-style economies, China's economy today shares many
of the characteristics of a market economy." It is now possible, therefore, to
determine whether the Chinese government "has bestowed a benefit upon a Chinese
producer (i.e., the subsidy can be identified and measured) and whether any such
benefit is specific."80 Following its analyses set out in the Georgetown Steel Memo,
the DOC determined that the Chinese CFS paper producers were subsidized by the
Chinese government within the meaning of the countervailing duty law.'
While stating that market forces in China are sufficiently developed to
permit the identification and measurement of subsidies, the DOC also held that
"market forces in China are not yet sufficiently developed to permit the use of
prices and costs in that country for the Department's dumping analysis."82 As a
result, the DOC still designates China as an NME for antidumping purposes and
still employs its NME methodology for determining normal value in antidumping
proceedings involving imports from China."
See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China, Indonesia and the
Republic of Korea, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,546 (Dep't of Commerce Nov. 27, 2006) (initiation of
countervailing duty investigations).
n See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia & Lawrence Norton, Office of Policy, Import
Admin., to David M. Spooner, Asst. Sec'y, Import Admin., Countervailing Duty Investigation of
Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China-Whether the Analytical Elements of the
Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China's Present-Day Economy (Mar. 29, 2007) [hereafter
Georgetown Steel Memo].
7 Id at 4.
79 In support of this finding the DOC stated:
[P]rivate industry now dominates many sectors of the Chinese economy, and
entrepreneurship is flourishing. Foreign trading rights have been given to over 200,000
firms. Many business entities in present-day China are generally free to direct most aspects
of their operations, and to respond to (albeit limited) market forces. The role of central
planners is vastly smaller.
Id. at 10.
80 id.
" See Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,645 (Dep't of Commerce Oct. 25, 2007).
However, the countervailing duty investigation in the CFS paper case did not lead to the imposition of
countervailing duties because the International Trade Commission made a negative final determination
as to injury. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUBLICATION 3695, COATED FREE-SHEET PAPER FROM
CHINA, INDONESIA, AND KOREA (FINAL) (Dec. 2007).
82 SHAUNA LEE-ALAIA ET AL., IMP. ADMIN., ANTIDUMPING DUTY INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN
LINED PAPER PRODUCTS FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ("CHINA")-CHINA'S STATUS AS A
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III. DOUBLE COUNTING: A COMPLEX LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The U.S. decision to apply the countervailing duty law in conjunction with
the antidumping law to imports from China "opened the Pandora's box" in world
trade.84 Since the CFS paper case, the DOC initiated concurrent antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations concerning thirty Chinese products and made
positive antidumping and countervailing duty determinations for most of them."
One legal issue that has proven particularly enigmatic is the potential
double counting or double remedies of subsidies when imports are simultaneously
subject to countervailing duties and antidumping duties calculated using an NME
surrogate country methodology. As this Article will discuss, the current subsidy
regulation regime provides scant guidance on how to analyze the double counting
issue, and the administrative, judicial, legislative, and dispute settlement bodies
involved in the dispute have offered conflicting views on the issue.
A. The Double Counting Hypothesis
Although there are divergent views as to whether subsidies are indeed
being double-counted in concurrent NME antidumping and countervailing duty
cases, there appears to be a consensus on why the double counting of subsidies in
such cases might occur. According to what could be referred to as the "double
counting hypothesis," a subsidy will be counted twice when the DOC imposes
countervailing duties to offset the subsidy, and then compares a subsidy-free normal
value derived from a surrogate country with the subsidized export price to calculate
the amount of antidumping duties. Figure 1 below illustrates the potential double
counting of subsidies in such scenario.
In Figure 1, N represents the normal value of the merchandise subject to
concurrent antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. P is the export
price of the merchandise. The dumping margin for the merchandise, therefore, is
a = N - P. Now the government of the exporting country confers a subsidy in the
amount of s on the merchandise. According to the double counting hypothesis, the
exporter will reduce the export price pro rata as a result of the subsidy. For the
sake of simplicity, suppose that the export price decreases by the same amount as
the subsidy, s, from P to P'. In market economy cases, the decrease in the export
price will not lead to a corresponding increase in the dumping margin, because the
normal value of the merchandise will also decrease by s, from N to N'. That is
because the normal value in market economy cases is based on the actual prices or
costs prevailing in the exporting country,16 and those prices and costs will decrease
by the same amount as the amount of the subsidy. After the conferral of the
subsidy, the dumping margin in market economy cases is b = N' - P', which is the
same as a, the dumping margin before the conferral of the subsidy.
In NME cases, however, the decrease in the export price of the
merchandise presumably leads to a corresponding increase in the dumping margin,
Dukgeun Ahn & Jieun Lee, Countervailing Duty Against China: Opening a Pandora's Box in
the WTO System?, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 18 (2011).
8s See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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as the normal value in NME cases is based on unsubsidized prices or costs from a
surrogate country and will not decrease as a result of the subsidy. In NME cases,
the dumping margin after the conferral of the subsidy will be c = N - P', which is
the sum of a, the dumping margin before the conferral of the subsidy, and s, the
amount of the subsidy. If the importing country imposes countervailing duties in
the amount of s in addition to antidumping duties in the amount of c, the subsidy
will be counted twice, as the amount of antidumping duties already includes the
amount of the subsidy.






B. The Scant Legal Framework Regarding Double Counting
Despite the potential for the double counting of subsidies in concurrent
NME antidumping and countervailing duty cases, the current subsidy regulation
regime provides scant guidance as to how to approach this issue. Article VI:5 of
GATT 1994, the only WTO rule directly on point, provides that "[n]o product of
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to
compensate for the same situation of dumping or export subsidization."" This
requirement, however, only applies to export subsidies, i.e., subsidies contingent on
export performance." GATT 1994 and other WTO agreements do not specifically
8 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT
1994], art. V1:5.
88 GATT 1994 does not define the term "export subsidy." The SCM Agreement, however, uses
the phrase "subsidies contingent ... upon export performance" to refer to export subsidies. See SCM
Agreement, supra note 41, art. 3.1(a). Consistent with the SCM Agreement, U.S. countervailing duty
law defines an export subsidy as "a subsidy that is, in law or in fact, contingent upon export
performance, alone or as I of 2 or more conditions." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(B) (2011).
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address the question of whether and how double counting should be accounted for
in scenarios involving domestic subsidies."
Consistent with the GATT's prohibition on the double counting of export
subsidies, U.S. antidumping law requires the DOC to adjust the amount of
antidumping duties when countervailing duties are applied simultaneously to offset
an export subsidy on the same merchandise. 90 But like GATT 1994, U.S.
antidumping law is silent on the handling of the double counting of domestic
subsidies, in both market economy and NME cases. In cases involving market
economies, the DOC's standard practice is not to make adjustments to the U.S.
price for domestic subsidies, on the theory that in such cases, "[d]omestic subsidies
presumably lower the price of the subject merchandise both in the home and the
U.S. markets, and therefore have no effect on the measurement of any dumping that
might also occur." 9' But prior to the application of the countervailing law to China,
the DOC had not had the occasion to address the question of whether the U.S. price
should be adjusted to avoid double counting domestic subsidies in NME cases.
C. Different Views on Double Counting
The lack of specific rules on the double counting issue under relevant
WTO agreements and U.S. statutes leaves a legal void as to whether and how
double counting should be accounted for in NME cases. Since the inception of the
current round of subsidy disputes, various administrative, judicial, legislative, and
dispute settlement bodies have ventured to provide their own views of the issue.
This Article outlines these views below.
1. The Department of Commerce
In the CFS paper case92 and a number of subsequent parallel antidumping
and countervailing duty cases concerning imports from China," the government of
China argued that double counting will always be a possibility whenever a product
is simultaneously subject to countervailing duties and antidumping duties calculated
using the DOC's NME methodology.9 4  The Chinese government's argument
89 Neither GATT 1994 nor the SCM Agreement provides a definition of domestic subsidies.
U.S. countervailing duty law, however, defines a domestic subsidy as "a specific subsidy [other than an
export subsidy or import substitution subsidy], in law or in fact, to an enterprise or industry within the
jurisdiction of the authority providing the subsidy." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(201 1).
90 See id. § 1677a(c)(1)(C).
91 Low Enriched Uranium from France, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,501, 46,506 (Dep't of Commerce Aug.
3, 2004) (notice of final results of antidumping duty administrative review).
92 See supra Part II.C.3.
93 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
94 STEPHEN J. CLAEYS, IMP. ADMIN., ISSUES AND DECISION MEMORANDUM FOR THE FINAL
DETERMINATION IN THE LESS-THAN-FAIR-VALUE INVESTIGATION OF COATED FREE SHEET PAPER
FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 11 (2007) [hereinafter CFS PAPER AD I&D MEMO],
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/prc/E7-21041-1.pdf. Although the CFS paper case did
not result in the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties due to the negative final injury
determination by the ITC, all of the subsequent parallel antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations concerning imports from China refer to the analyses of the double counting issue in the
CFS paper case. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CLAEYS, IMP. ADMIN., ISSUES AND DECISION MEMORANDUM
FOR THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF SALES AT LESS THAN FAIR VALUE IN CIRCULAR WELDED
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echoed the double counting hypothesis illustrated in Figure 1 above: When a non-
subsidized surrogate value is used for normal value, double counting will arise
because, while the U.S. price is reduced due to the cost savings from the subsidy,
the effect of the subsidy will not be reflected in the normal value. The Chinese
government argued that U.S. antidumping law implicitly embodies the presumption
that subsidies automatically "pass through" to export prices, as seen from the
statutory provision requiring adjustments to the U.S. price for export subsidies and
the DOC's practice of not granting adjustments for domestic subsidies in market
economy cases. 96 This subsidy pass-through presumption, the Chinese government
argued, requires the DOC to adjust the U.S. prices for domestic subsidies in NME
cases because domestic subsidies automatically pass through to export prices but do
not reduce normal values." Furthermore, the Chinese government argued that the
presumption that domestic subsidies lower export prices is the whole basis of
imposing countervailing duties on such subsidies."
The DOC rejected all of the Chinese government's key arguments. Citing
the "typically direct connection between export subsidies and exports," the DOC
agreed with the Chinese government that the statutory requirement for adjustments
to antidumping duties for export subsidies rests on the presumption that export
subsidies automatically lower export prices, pro rata.99 The DOC, however,
dismissed as "speculative" the proposition that domestic subsidies automatically
lower export prices.'" Rejecting the Chinese government's argument that the
presumption that domestic subsidies lower prices is the whole basis for imposing
countervailing duties on such subsidies, the DOC argued that "[w]hile subsidies
unquestionably benefit their recipients, it is by no means certain that those
recipients automatically respond to subsidies by lowering their prices, pro rata, as
opposed to investing in capital improvements, retiring debt, or any number of other
uses."'o Nor did the DOC find any indication in the statute or legislative history
that Congress harbored any presumption about the effect of domestic subsidies on
export prices.10 2 Finally, the DOC denied the Chinese government's assertion that it
had previously assumed that domestic subsidies fully pass through to home-market
and export prices. According to the DOC, a more accurate description of its
practice is that the DOC had "sometimes presumed that, whatever the effect, if any,
of domestic subsidies upon the prices subsequently charged by their recipients, that
effect would be the same for domestic prices and export prices."0 3 Since the
presumption of a subsidy pass-through was the only basis on which the Chinese
government requested duty adjustments to avoid double counting, the DOC denied
the request.'
CARBON QUALITY STEEL PIPE FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 19-22 (2008), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/prc/E8-12606-I.pdf.
9 See CFS PAPER AD I&D MEMO, supra note 94, at 10.
96 See id. at 11.
9 Id.





103 Id at 15.
'0 See id
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2. The Court of International Trade
In September 2008, in the opening salvo of a protracted legal battle, a
Chinese respondent in one of the concurrent antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations initiated subsequent to the CFS paper case brought a lawsuit before
the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), challenging the DOC's antidumping
and countervailing duty determinations in that case. In September 2009, the CIT
issued its opinion in GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States (GPX I),o' in
which it rejected the DOC's double counting analyses in the agency proceedings
below.
Before turning to the double counting issue, the CIT first examined
whether it was lawful for the DOC to apply the countervailing duty law to China in
the first place. Noting the ambiguity of both the Federal Circuit's Georgetown
Steel ruling and the countervailing duty law itself as to the applicability of the
countervailing duty law to NMEs,'06 the CIT stated that it "cannot say from the
statutory language alone that Commerce does not have the authority to impose
[countervailing duties] on products from an NME-designated country."107
After concluding that the DOC may have the authority to apply the
countervailing duty law to NMEs, the CIT went on to hold that the DOC's
interpretation and methodologies as to the concurrent application of antidumping
and countervailing duties to imports from China were nonetheless
"unreasonable."' 8 The CIT agreed with the double counting hypothesis illustrated
in Figure 1 above, stating that comparing the subsidized export price with the
unsubsidized constructed normal value in calculating antidumping duties "could
very well result in a double remedy."109
If there is substantial potential for the double counting of subsidies, as the
CIT held there is in the concurrent application of NME antidumping and
countervailing duties to imports from China,"0 the issue then becomes, according to
the CIT, an issue about the allocation of the burden of proof. The CIT held that it
was unreasonable for the DOC to require respondents to submit specific evidence to
demonstrate the existence of double counting,"' because "there is likely no way for
any respondent to accurately prove what may very well be occurring."' 2 The CIT
held that "if it is too difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what
degree double counting is occurring, Commerce should refrain from imposing
.o. GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2009)
[hereinafter GPXI].
106 See id at 1237-39.
107 Id. at 1239.
ios Id. at 1240. The CIT's approach is based on the Chevron doctrine, which requires a court to
"defer to the agency's interpretation of its own statute as long as that interpretation is reasonable." Id
(citing Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
"0 Id. at 1242.
110 In support of this holding, the CIT cited a report by the Government Accountability Office
that arrived at the same conclusion. See id. at 1243 n. 11.
... Id. at 1243.
112 Id. The CIT believed that the difficulty of demonstrating the effect of subsidies on price is
recognized by the countervailing duty law, which does not require the measurement of the price effect
in the calculation of countervailing duties. Id.
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[countervailing duties] on NME goods until it is prepared to address this problem
through improved methodologies or new statutory tools." 3
The CIT remanded the case for the DOC to either forego the imposition of
countervailing duties on the merchandise at issue or adopt additional policies and
procedures to adapt its NME antidumping and countervailing methodologies to
account for the double counting issue." 4 In its remand determination, the DOC
followed the latter route. It considered itself to have only three options left
regarding the parallel application of countervailing duties and NME antidumping
duties: (1) not to apply the countervailing duty law to the subject merchandise; (2)
apply the market economy antidumping methodology to the subject merchandise; or
(3) offset the countervailing duties against the NME antidumping cash deposit
rate."' The DOC chose the third option, reasoning that it was the "least
objectionable" one." 6
Respondents challenged the DOC's remand determination before the CIT
again. In August 2010, the CIT rejected the DOC's double counting analyses in its
remand determination. In GPX International Corp. v. United States (GPX 11), the
CIT noted that with the DOC's offset, the combination of the countervailing duty
margin and the NME antidumping cash deposit rate "will always equal the
unaltered NME AD margin," making the countervailing duty investigation
superfluous."'7 The CIT agreed with the respondents that it is not reasonable to
force them to spend time and resources to go through a countervailing duty
investigation, and then to eliminate the countervailing duty margin because it has
been offset by the parallel antidumping margin."' The CIT further held that besides
being unreasonable, the offset is also inconsistent with the antidumping law, as an
offset for domestic subsidies is not among permissible offsets to the U.S. price in
the calculation of antidumping duties."9 The CIT held that given the DOC's
inability to determine whether and to what degree double counting is occurring, and
in the absence of new statutory tools, the only option left for the DOC is not to
apply the countervailing duty law to imports from China.'20
3. WTO Dispute Settlement Panel
Around the same time when the plaintiffs in the GPX 1 case filed their suit
before the CIT, the government of China requested consultations with the United
States at the WTO regarding the imposition of antidumping and countervailing
duties by the United States on imports of four products from China in DS379.12 1
"13 id.
1" Id. at 1251.
"s DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL RESULTS OF REDETERMINATION PURSUANT TO REMAND 8
(2010), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/remands/09-103.pdf.
116 Id.
" GPX Int'l Corp. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1345 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010)
[hereinafter GPX 11].
11 Id.
120 Id at 1346.
121 See Request for Consultations by China, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/1 (Sept. 22, 2008). The four
444 49:2
The Precarious State of Subsidy Regulation
Among others, China challenged the DOC's treatment of the double counting issue
as being inconsistent with the United States' obligations under various WTO
- 22provisions.
In its final report issued in October 2010, the WTO dispute settlement
panel established to hear China's challenges (Panel) explained what it understood to
be the reason for double counting.123 In its explanations, the Panel stated the double
counting hypothesis illustrated in Figure 1 above, noting that the use of an NME
methodology leads to "an asymmetric dumping margin comparison between an
unsubsidized normal value and subsidized export price." 24 In other words, the
Panel recognized that the double counting of subsidies in concurrent NME
antidumping and countervailing duty cases is at least a theoretical possibility.125
But after suggesting that double counting is theoretically possible, the
Panel went on to hold that even if it does occur, it is not inconsistent with the
relevant WTO provisions cited by China.126 The Panel concluded that since double
counting poses no concerns under WTO law, it was not necessary for it to examine
whether double counting did result from the concurrent imposition of NME
antidumping duties and countervailing duties in the four sets of DOC investigations
-127
at issue.
4. WTO Appellate Body
China appealed the Panel's double counting analyses in DS379 to the
Appellate Body of the WTO. In its final report issued in March 2011, the Appellate
Body accepted the Panel's understanding of why double counting might occur.'2
However, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findings as to whether relevant
WTO provisions prohibit double counting. Specifically, the Appellate Body held
that the Panel failed to give meaning and effect to all the terms of Article 19.3 of
the SCM Agreement, which requires a countervailing duty to be imposed "in the
products at issue were circular welded carbon quality steel pipe, new pneumatic off-the-road tires,
light-walled rectangular pipe and tube, and laminated woven sacks. See id. at 1-3.
122 See Report of the Panel, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties
on Certain Products from China, IM 14.8-.10, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter DS379 Panel
Report].
123 See id 114.67-.76.
124 Id. 14.72 (emphasis in original).
125 Before the Panel, China argued that "a double remedy arises in all instances of concurrent
application of countervailing duties and of anti-dumping duties calculated pursuant to a methodology
relying on surrogate values." Id. T 14.50 (emphasis in original). That is because, in China's view, "the
rationale for using an NME methodology in an antidumping investigation subsumes the rationale for
imposing countervailing duties . . . ." Id China argued that when the DOC uses its NME methodology
to calculate the amount of antidumping duties, it "necessarily" captures any trade-distorting effects of
alleged subsidies in the antidumping margin. Id. This argument was an apparent effort to avoid the
burden of proof problem the Chinese respondents encountered in the DOC proceedings below. The
Panel, however, did not address this argument.
126 For the Panel's analyses regarding these WTO provisions, see DS379 Panel Report, supra
note 122, $T 14.104-140.
127 See id 14.76.
128 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 542-43, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter DS379 AB Report].
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appropriate amounts in each case." 29 The Appellate Body reasoned that under
Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, "the amount of a countervailing duty cannot
be 'appropriate' in situations where that duty represents the full amount of the
subsidy and where antidumping duties, calculated at least to some extent on the
basis of the same subsidization, are imposed concurrently to remove the same
injury to the domestic industry."'30
The Appellate Body next considered whether the DOC's handling of the
double counting issue in the four sets of investigations at issue was consistent with
Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body first determined that the
occurrence of double counting depends on "whether and to what extent domestic
subsidies have lowered the export price of a product, and on whether the
investigating authority has taken the necessary corrective steps to adjust its
methodology to take account of this factual situation.""' The Appellate Body then
noted that in the four sets of DOC investigations at dispute, the DOC "did not
initiate any examination of whether double remedies would arise in the four
investigations at issue and refused outright to afford any consideration to the issue
or to the submissions pertaining to the issue that were presented to it." 32 According
to the Appellate Body, the DOC's failure to conduct any factual inquiries regarding
double counting was inconsistent with Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement, as the
obligation to determine the appropriate amount of countervailing duties under




On the domestic litigation front, the United States appealed to the Federal
Circuit the CIT's ruling in GPXII, which, as discussed earlier, ordered the DOC not
to apply the countervailing duty law to NMEs.13 4 In December 2011, in GPX
International Corp. v. United States (GPX II), a three-judge panel of the Federal
Circuit affirmed the CIT's GPX II ruling, albeit on a different ground than that
relied on by the CIT."' In GPX III, while upholding the CIT's ruling that the DOC
was not allowed to apply the countervailing duty law to NMEs, the Federal Circuit
considered it "problematic" for the CIT to predicate its ruling on the possible
occurrence of double counting, because it was unclear to what extent the statute
prohibits double counting, and because the DOC had determined that "it is far from
clear that double counting has in fact occurred." 36 Rather, the Federal Circuit held
that the DOC was barred by the countervailing duty statute from imposing






134 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
666 F.3d 732 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter GPX III].
136 GPX III, 666 F.3d at 737.
137 id.
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ratification, the Federal Circuit concluded that Congress ratified the DOC's policy
of not applying the countervailing duty law to NMEs when it enacted amendments
to U.S. trade law statutes in 1984, 1988, and 1994 without making any changes that
would have altered that policy.'
6. Congress
By basing its decision in GPXIII on its construction of congressional intent
as to the application of the countervailing duty law to NMEs, the Federal Circuit
essentially threw the ball to Congress. Indeed, at the end of its GPXIII opinion, the
Federal Circuit invited Congress to act, stating that "if [DOC] believes that the law
should be changed, the appropriate approach is to seek legislative change.""'
Congress took up the Federal Circuit's invitation. Legislation in response
to the Federal Circuit's GPX III decision was quickly passed by both chambers of
Congress and was signed by President Obama into law as P.L. 112-99 on March 13,
2012.140 In an outright repeal of the Federal Circuit's ruling in GPXIII, section 1(a)
of P.L. 112-99 amended U.S. countervailing duty law by adding a provision stating
that, generally, "the merchandise on which countervailing duties shall be imposed
under [section 701(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930] includes a class or kind of
merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United
States from a nonmarket economy country."l 4' This new provision applies
retroactively to all countervailing duty proceedings initiated on or after November
20, 2006, the date the DOC's Georgetown Steel Memo was issued.142
Congress was mindful that by reinstating the applicability of the
countervailing duty law to NMEs, it was bringing the double counting issue back
into the fray. To provide the statutory authority for dealing with the double
counting issue, section 2(a) of P.L. 112-99 amended the countervailing duty statute
by adding a new provision that gives the DOC the authority to adjust the
antidumping duty amount to take account of the double counting of subsidies if a
countervailable subsidy "has been demonstrated" to lower the export price of the
subject merchandise, and if the DOC "can reasonably estimate" the magnitude of
the double counting of subsidies.143 This provision applies to all countervailing duty
investigations and reviews initiated on or after the enactment of the law, as well as
all section 129 determinations issued on or after the enactment of the law.'"
What section 2(a) of P.L. 112-99 is not clear about, however, is who has
the burden of proof regarding double counting. P.L. 112-99 states that double
13 See id. at 740-43.
13 id.
140 See Act of Mar. 13, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-99, 126 Stat. 265 [hereinafter P.L. 112-99].
Section I29 determinations are determinations issued by the DOC in accordance with section 129 of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) to render the DOC's action in a specific trade remedy
proceeding "not inconsistent" with the findings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel or the Appellate
Body. See URAA, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 129(b)(2), 108 Stat. 4809, 4837 (codified at 19 U.S.C.§ 3538(b)(2)(201 1)).
141 P.L. 112-99, supra note 140, § 1(a).
142 Id. § 1(b).
143 Id. § 2(a).
'4 Id. § 2(b).
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counting must be accounted for if a subsidy "has been demonstrated" to lower the
export price of the subject merchandise. But demonstrated by whom--the
petitioner, the respondent, or the DOC? Moreover, even if the party that is required
to have the burden of proof does demonstrate that a subsidy has lowered the export
price of the subject merchandise, double counting will be accounted for under
section 2(a) of P.L. 112-99 only if the DOC "can reasonably estimate" the extent to
which the subsidy is being double counted. It appears that under this provision, the
DOC does not have to account for double counting if it somehow could not
reasonably estimate the magnitude of double counting. This stands in contrast with
the Appellate Body's finding in DS379 that an investigating authority has an
affirmative obligation to demonstrate that double counting is not occurring before it
imposes countervailing duties concurrent with NME antidumping duties. '1
7. The Department of Commerce on Remand
On the international front, on July 31, 2012, the DOC issued its revised
determinations for the four sets of investigations challenged in DS379 pursuant to
the procedures set forth in section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act for
implementing adverse WTO rulings.14 On August 21, 2012, the DOC officially
implemented these section 129 determinations as instructed by the United States
Trade Representative. 147
In its section 129 determinations, the DOC first addressed the question of
who has the burden to prove whether double counting is occurring. The DOC
determined that "the burden is on a respondent to demonstrate its entitlement to a
particular adjustment [to its antidumping cash deposit rate]." 48 The wording of this
conclusion appears to be intentional: The DOC considered the burden of proof at
issue here not the burden of proof for double counting, but the burden of proof for
adjustments to the export price in antidumping proceedings.14 In so doing, the
DOC avoided directly stating that respondents have the burden to prove the
145 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
146 See Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People's Republic of China (Dep't
of Commerce July 31, 2012) (final section 129 determination) [hereinafter CWP Section 129
Determination], available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/sectionl29/prc-cwcq-steel-pipe-Final-129-
Determination-20120830.pdf; Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People's Republic
of China (Dep't of Commerce July 31, 2012) (final section 129 determination), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/sectionl29/prc-otr-tires-Final-129-Determination-20120830.pdf;
Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China (Dep't of Commerce July 31, 2012)
(final section 129 determination), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/sectionl29/prc-lw-sacks-
Final-I 29-Determination-20120830.pdf.
147 See Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires: Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe;
Laminated Woven Sacks; and Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People's Republic of
China, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,683, 52,683 (Dep't of Commerce Aug. 30, 2012) (implementation of
determinations).
148 See CWP Section 129 Determination, supra note 146, at 14. Since the DOC's discussions of
the double counting issue are verbatim identical across the four proposed section 129 determinations,
the other three determinations will not be separately cited.
149 Among others, the DOC cited the Statement of Administrative Action for the URAA and a
DOC rule providing that in making adjustments to the export price in antidumping proceedings, "[t]he
interested party that is in possession of the relevant information has the burden of establishing to the
satisfaction of the Secretary the amount and nature of a particular adjustment." See id. n.41.
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existence of double counting-a stance that would be contrary to the Appellate
Body's finding in DS379-while achieving practically the same outcome.
Then, after recounting the difficulties it encountered in conducting the
factual inquiries required by the Appellate Body for the double counting analysis,
the DOC determined that, with respect to input subsidies, i.e., subsidies on the
inputs for manufacturing the subject merchandise, the Chinese respondents met
their burden of proof to receive an adjustment to their antidumping cash deposit
rates.so The DOC then compared the ratio of change between an aggregate-level
China purchasing price index and an aggregate-level China production price
index,s' and found that sixty-three percent of the alleged input subsidies passed
through to the export price of the subject merchandise.152 As a result, the DOC
subtracted sixty-three percent of the input subsidies from the export prices of the
subject merchandise in calculating the respondent firms' new antidumping cash
deposit rates.'
8. The Saga Continues
Six years after the DOC first applied the countervailing duty law to China,
and after the DOC, the CIT, a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, the Appellate Body,
the Federal Circuit, and United States Congress each weighed in on the double
counting controversy, an end to the dispute is still nowhere in sight. Domestically,
litigation in the GPX case continues over the constitutionality of the retroactive
application of P.L. 112-99.154 International litigation over the double counting issue
also continues. At the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) meeting on August
31, 2012, the United States claimed that it had brought the measures challenged in
DS379 into full compliance with the DSB recommendations and rulings,'55 in
apparent reference to the DOC's section 129 determinations implemented on
August 21, 2012.156 On September 28, 2012, however, China made a statement to
the DSB that it did not agree with the U.S. claim that it had fully complied with the
DSB recommendations and rulings in DS379."' Additionally, on September 17,
2012, China initiated a new WTO dispute settlement proceeding against the United
50 Id. at 14.
'' Id The datasets relied on by the DOC were China Purchasing Price YoY (CNPPIY) and
China PPI YoY (CHEFTYOY), both of which are compiled by Bloomberg. Id
152 CWP Section 129 Determination, supra note 146, at 19 ("The GOC alleges that the
Department's finding that only 63 percent of the alleged input subsidies passed through to the price of
subject merchandise is contrary to the rationale for imposing countervailing duties in the full amount of
the subsidy.").
" See, e.g., id. at 35-36.
154 Plaintiffs in the GPX case argued that P.L. 112-99 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, as well as Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. See
GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States, No. 08-00285, slip op. 13-2 at 8 (Ct. Int'l Trade Jan. 7, 2013).
The CIT ruled against the plaintiffs on their constitutional claims. See id. at 62.
15s See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS379, United States--Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/cases-e/ds379_e.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2012).
156 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
15 id.
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States, DS449, challenging the newly enacted P.L. 112-99."' Among other
arguments, China claimed that both the absence of legal authority under P.L. 112-
99 to account for double counting in proceedings initiated between November 20,
2006 and March 13, 2012 and U.S. failures to account for double counting in those
proceedings are inconsistent with a number of provisions under the SCM
Agreement and the WTO Antidumping Agreement." 9
IV. THE SUBSIDY PASS-THROUGH PRESUMPTION: ECONOMIC FALLACIES
From the above analyses, it is obvious that the double counting hypothesis
is premised on the presumption that a subsidy passes through to the price of the
subsidized product. This subsidy pass-through presumption has been
acknowledged as theoretically possible by the DOC,160 the CIT,'6 the WTO Panel ,162
and the Appellate Body.66 The Federal Circuit found it inappropriate for the CIT to
predicate its rulings in GPX I and GPX II on double counting, but it did so without
challenging the theoretical validity of the subsidy pass-through presumption. *
The subsidy pass-through presumption also underlies the allocation of the
burden of proof for double counting. In GPX I, the CIT required the DOC to have
the burden to ascertain whether and to what extent double counting was occurring
because of the "substantial potential" for double counting.165 In DS379, implicit in
the Appellate Body's finding that the DOC must affirmatively investigate whether
double counting is occurring is the acknowledgment that double counting is at least
theoretically possible. 66
The allocation of the burden of proof, in turn, may very well determine the
outcome of a double counting dispute. As discussed earlier, both the CIT and the
Appellate Body have required the DOC to conduct factual inquiries to ascertain
whether double counting is occurring as a matter of fact.'16  But it could be very
difficult, if not entirely impossible, to prove a causal relationship between the
receipt of a subsidy and a decrease in the price of the subsidized product, as the
1ss See Request for Consultations by China, United States-Countervailing and Anti-Dumping
Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/1 (Sept. 20, 2012).
' See id at 4-5. China claimed that such failures violate Articles 10, 15, 19, 21, and 32 of the
SCM Agreement, Article VI of GATT 1994, and Articles 9 and II of the WTO Antidumping
Agreement. Id.
16o Although the DOC rejected China's argument that U.S. countervailing duty law presumes
subsidy pass-through, it did not reject the theoretical possibility of subsidy pass-through. See supra
Part Ill.C.I.
161 Recall that in GPX I, the CIT recounted the double counting hypothesis before holding that
the DOC was required to account for double counting. See GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1240-42 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2009).
162 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
In DS379, the Appellate Body cited, approvingly, the Panel's and the DOC's views on why
double counting might be occurring. See DS379 AB Report, supra note 128, 602 n.589.
See supra Part Ill.C.5.
16' GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 ("If there is a substantial potential for double counting, and it
is too difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what degree double counting is occurring,
Commerce should refrain from imposing [countervailing duties] on NME goods until it is prepared to
address this problem through improved methodologies or new statutory tools.").
1 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 111, 133 and accompanying text.
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final price of a product usually encompasses dozens or even more cost items,68
subsidies being only one of them. As the CIT observed in GPXI, "there is likely no
way for any respondent to accurately prove what may very well be happening [with
respect to double counting.]"'6  Given the difficulties of proving the factual
existence of double counting, the allocation of the burden of proof becomes a
crucial factor in resolving double counting disputes.o Not surprisingly, both the
United States and China attached much importance to the burden of proof issue in
DS379.1'
With so much riding on the subsidy pass-through presumption, it is curious
that none of the double counting analyses offered so far has even questioned the
validity of the presumption. In this Part, the Article demonstrates that the
economics behind the subsidy pass-through presumption is wrong. Drawing upon
economic theory of firm behavior, this Article shows that a subsidy changes the
productive behavior of a subsidy recipient only if it lowers the marginal cost of
production of the recipient, and a subsidy passes through to the price of the
subsidized product only if the subsidy recipient has market power in the market for
the subsidized product. In other words, the subsidy pass-through presumption is
valid in much narrower circumstances than proponents of the double counting
hypothesis have assumed it to be.
A. The Behavioral Impact of Subsidies
The first step in understanding the falsity of the subsidy pass-through
presumption is to note that not all subsidies cause subsidy recipients to alter their
output level or price. Below, the term "behavioral impact" will be used to refer to
the impact of a subsidy on the output level or price of a subsidy recipient. For a
subsidy to have a behavioral impact, it must cause a subsidy recipient to change
either its output level or price, or both.
As discussed earlier, the scope of subsidies that are subject to regulation
under the SCM Agreement is very broad. Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is
defined as a financial contribution that confers a benefit on a specific enterprise or
16 This can be seen from the DOC's calculation of the constructed value of imports from NMEs.
In constructing the value of an NME product, the DOC includes materials, labor, energy and utilities,
factory overhead, selling, general and administrative expenses, profit, and packing. See IMPORT
ADMIN., 2009 ANTIDUMPING MANUAL: CH. 10: NON-MARKET ECONOMIES 17-18 (2009), available at
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/2009/Chapter/ 20/0%20NME.pdf. Note that the cost items included in
the DOC's calculation are broad categories and can be broken down into more specific items.
Materials, for example, could be broken down into as many items as the manufacturing of the product
requires.
6 GPXI, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
'7" In its section 129 determinations in DS379, the DOC did conclude that the Chinese
respondents met their burden of proof with respect to input subsidies. See supra note 150 and
accompanying text. But the DOC based that determination on a simple correlation between changes in
input prices and changes in product prices. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. This
approach is erroneous because the DOC did not control for other factors that may have caused changes
in product prices.
' in DS379, China and the United States each argued that the burden of proof belonged to the
other side. China argued that it was "the obligation of the investigating authority to investigate and
make a determination as to whether it is offsetting the same subsidies twice," whereas the United States
argued that "the burden to establish the existence of such an alleged double remedy would be on
China." DS379 AB Report, supra note 128, $ 600.
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industry or a group of enterprises or industries.1 2  This definition makes no
distinction between subsidies that cause recipients to change productive behavior
and subsidies that do not cause recipients to change productive behavior. An
example of subsidies in the former category is a fixed payment to the recipient on
each unit of its products. With a lower cost of production, the subsidy recipient
may increase production or lower price."' An example of subsidies in the latter
category will be a lump-sum payment that is not contingent on the recipient
meeting any performance requirements. Such a subsidy will not alter the
recipient's productive behavior and will only result in a transfer of benefits to the
recipient."1
That not all subsidies have a behavioral impact is supported by economic
theory on firm behavior. In an important contribution to the economic literature on
subsidies, Professors Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz laid out the general framework
for analyzing the behavioral impact of subsidies.' They argued that for a foreign
subsidy to adversely affect the interests of a U.S. producer, the subsidy must either
directly or indirectly lower the foreign producer's marginal cost of production.'1
One example of such cost-reducing subsidies given by Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz
is a reduction in the price of a variable input."'
The economic reasoning behind Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz's proposition
is straightforward. In economics, the marginal cost of production is the cost of
producing one additional unit of products, whereas the marginal revenue is the
increased revenue from selling one additional unit of products."' When the
marginal cost of production is lower than the marginal revenue, it is more profitable
for a firm to increase production and vice versa. A profit-maximizing firm,
therefore, will choose a level of production where the marginal cost of production
equals the marginal revenue, whether the firm is perfectly competitive or a
monopoly.' Figures 2 and 3 below illustrate the productive behavior of a perfectly
competitive firm and a monopoly firm respectively.
In Figure 2, MC represents the marginal cost of production of a perfectly
competitive firm and MR represents the marginal revenue of such firm. Because a
perfectly competitive firm cannot influence the market price, it faces a horizontal
demand curve, DD, which is also the firm's marginal-revenue curve, MR.'o The
marginal-cost curve intersects with the marginal-revenue curve at (p, qo), meaning
that the firm produces q0 units at price p. When a subsidy lowers the marginal cost
of production, the marginal-cost curve shifts downward from MC to MC' and
intersects with the marginal-revenue curve at (p, q'), meaning that the firm
produces q' units at price p. The subsidy has an impact on the firm's productive
172 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
173 See Diamond, Economic Foundations, supra note 12, at 788-89.
174 See id at 787.
1 See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12.
17 Id at 23. Note that Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz used the term "variable cost" to refer to
"marginal cost."
'7n Id.
"7 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICs 283 tbl.2 (6th ed. 2008).
"7 For analysis of profit maximization by a perfectively competitive firm, see id. at 283-84. For
analysis of profit maximization by a monopoly, see id at 306-07.
s0 See id at 281, 304.
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behavior because it induces the firm to increase its volume of production.
However, for this to happen, the subsidy must cause the marginal-cost curve to shift
by lowering the firm's marginal cost of production.
Figure 2. The Productive Behavior of a Perfectly Competitive Firm
MR/DD
q qo q1
The same also holds true for a firm with market power. Figure 3 below
illustrates the productive behavior of a monopoly firm in response to a subsidy. In
Figure 3, MC represents the marginal cost of production of a monopoly firm and
MR represents the marginal revenue of such firm. Since the quantity of the output
of a monopoly firm could influence the market price, the marginal-revenue curve
facing a monopoly firm, MR, is downward sloping"' and is always lower than the
market demand curve, DD .82 Like a perfectly competitive firm, however, a
monopoly firm will choose a level of production where the marginal cost equals the
marginal revenue to maximize profits.'8 ' This means that the monopoly firm will
produce qo units at price po. When a subsidy lowers the monopoly firm's marginal
cost of production, the marginal-cost curve shifts downward from MC to MC'. As a
result of the subsidy, the monopoly firm produces q' units at price pl. The subsidy
has an impact on the monopoly firm's productive behavior, as it induces the
monopoly to increase production and lower the price. For this to happen, the
subsidy must cause the marginal-cost curve to shift by lowering the marginal cost
of production.
1"' See id. at 305-06.
182 This is because when a monopoly increases production, the price of all units sold must fall.
See id. at 306 fig.3.
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Richard Diamond refined Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz's analysis and
applied it to specific types of subsidies. " Diamond made it clear that the receipt of
a subsidy by a firm does not per se change any of its actions or the action of any
other participants in the relevant market."' Consistent with Goetz, Granet, and
Schwartz's theory, Diamond argued that a subsidy will cause the recipient firm to
change its productive behavior in a manner that adversely affects the "entitlement"
of U.S. producers only if it lowers the recipient firm's marginal cost of
production.1 6 Diamond categorized various types of subsidies into three groups
based on their impact on the recipient firm's marginal cost. First, some subsidies
do not affect the marginal cost of the recipient firm. These subsidies include,
among others, subsidies intended as a transfer of benefits to owners of the recipient
firm and subsidies provided to cover operating losses, to decommission unused
facilities, to help in the clean-up of existing company wastes, or to pay vested
retirement allowances if the payments were unanticipated.18 1 Second, some
subsidies vary with production and therefore affect the recipient firm's marginal
cost. Examples of these subsidies include per-unit subsidies (whereby the amount
of subsidies received by the recipient firm varies with the quantity produced) and
input subsidies (whereby the subsidy is based on the consumption of an input
whose use varies with production)." Third, some subsidies affect firm decisions
regarding capital assets, i.e., factors of production that remain fixed during the
period for which production is set. Examples of these subsidies include grants"'
and low cost loans'" that are used to purchase capital assets."' As Diamond
1 See Diamond, Economic Foundations, supra note 12, at 783.
185 Id.
8 Id. at 784-85.
SId. at 787.
18 Id. at 788-91.
" Id. at 803.
"90 Id. at 805.
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explained, the impact of these subsidies on the recipient firm's marginal cost is
uncertain: It may result in lower, equal, or greater marginal cost depending on the
characteristics of the plant or machinery purchased.'92
The marginal-cost-of-production theory propounded by Goetz, Granet, and
Schwartz and by Diamond is not without skeptics. Alan Holmer, Sosau Haggerty
and William Hunter acknowledged that subsidies may not always alter the
productive behavior of the subsidy recipients, but they argued that a subsidy that
functions only as an income transfer to the subsidy recipient still affects the
entitlements of foreign producers because the subsidy will increase the revenues of
the recipient firm and will, over the long run, encourage other firms to enter the
subsidized sector.'93 Alan Sykes holds a similar view that "virtually all subsidies"
have the potential to cause recipients to increase output.194 According to Sykes, a
subsidy that increases the profitability of the recipient will attract more firms to
enter the market, leading to increased output over the long run.' However, even if
one were to accept the proposition that all subsidies increase output over the long
run, the current subsidy regulation regime does not require a subsidy to have
increased output before it could be regulated.' 6 It is entirely possible, therefore, for
a subsidy that does not alter the recipient firm's short-run cost structures and has yet
to cause long-run effects-therefore a subsidy that has no behavioral impact
yet-to be subject to regulation under the current subsidy regulation regime."
B. The Price Impact of Subsidies
Even assuming that all subsidies lower the marginal cost of production of
the recipient firm, that condition alone is not sufficient for a subsidy to have an
impact on the price of the subsidized product. As discussed below, for a subsidy to
'9' Id. at 801.
192 Id. at 803.
19 See Alan Holmer, Sosau Haggerty & William D. Hunter, Identifying and Measuring
Subsidies Under the Countervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at Synthesis, in I THE COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION AND EXPORT ADMINISTRATION 1984, at 301,
325-26 n.34 (1984).
194 Sykes, Questionable Case, supra note 12, at 515.
195 Id. at 515-16. Note that Sykes discussed the weakness of the marginal-cost-of-production
theory in the context of Annex 2 of the WTO Agriculture Agreement, which Sykes argued reflects the
marginal-cost-of-production theory by exempting certain government programs from the negotiated
ceilings on domestic support if they have "no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on
production." Id
19 As discussed in details below, the definition of the term "subsidies" under the SCM
Agreement only requires a subsidy to confer a benefit on the recipient; it does not require any
behavioral changes on the part of the recipient. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
197 Diamond made a similar point by arguing that even if a subsidy may induce future firms to
increase output, "no reason exists why it would not be sufficient to impose a countervailing duty on
such firms if and when they are subsidized." Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles, supra note
12, at 545. Diamond also pointed out that Holmer, Haggerty, and Hunter's argument assumes that the
subsidy offered to the first firm or a similar subsidy will be available to other firms, while it is a
question of fact whether such expectations realistically exist in a specific case. See id. Diamond
further argued that there are problems with imposing countervailing duties on products of a firm
receiving a subsidy on account of injury arising from the actions of future firms. First, in such scenario,
"there would seem to be no relationship between the duty charged and the injury caused." Id. n. 146.
Second, when the later entrants come under countervailing duty investigation, "duties to neutralize the
injury [caused by them] have already been paid by the first firm." Id.
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pass through to the price of the subsidized product, the structure of the market for
the subsidized product must be such that the recipient firm has the capacity to
influence the world price of the product.
That a subsidy lowers the recipient firm's marginal cost of production is
not a sufficient condition for the subsidy to have a price impact can be seen from
Figures 2 and 3 above. In Figure 2, where the subsidy recipient is a perfectly
competitive firm in the world market for the subsidized product, the lowering of the
firm's marginal cost of production causes the marginal-cost curve of the firm to
shift downward from MP to MP', but the new marginal-cost curve still intersects
with the demand curve at price p. The only change in the firm's productive
behavior caused by the subsidy is increased production volume from q0 to q'.
Suppose that DDd represents the domestic demand for the subsidized product.
Prior to the subsidy, the domestic demand for the subsidized product at price p is
qd, resulting in a net export of qdqo by the firm. After the subsidy is conferred, the
domestic demand for the product remains at qd, but the firm's quantity of
production increases from q0 to q', resulting in a net export of qdq1 by the firm. In
short, when a firm is too small to influence the world price of the subsidized
product, a subsidy, even if it lowers the firm's marginal cost of production, will not
pass through to the price of the subsidized product; it will only cause the firm to
increase production and exports.
But when the subsidy recipient is large enough to have market power in the
world market for the subsidized product, a subsidy that lowers the recipient firm's
marginal cost of production will have a price impact. Figure 3 illustrates the price
impact of a subsidy conferred on a monopoly firm. In Figure 3, because the
demand curve (DD) and the marginal-revenue curve (MR) facing a monopoly firm
are downward-sloping, a downward shift in the monopoly firm's marginal-cost
curve from MC to MC' in response to a subsidy in the amount of S will lead to both
a greater volume of production (q') and a lower price (p'). Note that in Figure 3,
the magnitude of the subsidy pass-through, p'po, does not necessarily equal the
amount of the subsidy, S. The exact amount of a subsidy that passes through to
price will depend on the shapes and slopes of the demand curve and of the
marginal-cost curve.'
While the above analyses are based on the assumption that a subsidy is
conferred on a single firm, the same also holds true if a subsidy is conferred on
more than one firm. Take, for example, the extreme case where a subsidy is
198 In its section 129 determinations in DS379, the DOC correctly rejected the Chinese
government's argument that a subsidy's impact on cost translates dollar-for-dollar to price. See CWP
Section 129 Determination, supra note 146, at 24-25. The DOC's rationale for its determination,
however, was incorrect. China argued that "producers in competitive markets tend to compete away
any temporary advantage that they obtain from lower costs by passing anything that reduces their cost
to the consumers in the form of lower prices." Id. at 23. According to China, therefore, the DOC's
conclusion that a producer who has lower costs can retain a significant portion of the cost reduction
implies that the producer possesses market power, a presumption the DOC presented no evidence to
substantiate. The DOC did not respond to that argument. Instead, it rejected China's argument by
citing a "feedback" effect of increased production on input prices. The DOC posited that firms that
expand output because of a subsidy will increase their demand for production inputs, and this increased
demand will in turn lead to higher input prices. Id. at 24-25. It is clear from the analysis presented
here that the DOC's resort to the feedback effect was unnecessary. As shown in Figure 3, even if a
firm has no market power, the magnitude of the pass-through of a subsidy is not necessarily one
hundred percent; it will depend on the shapes and slopes of the demand and supply curves.
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conferred on all firms in a domestic industry of the subsidy-granting country.'99 If
the output of the subsidy recipients collectively accounts for only a minuscule
percentage of the world market output, then a subsidy that reduces each recipient's
marginal cost of production will have no impact on the world market price, as
shown in Figure 2. But if the output of the subsidy recipients collectively accounts
for a large enough share of the world market output, the subsidy recipients taken as
a whole will face a downward-sloping demand curve as is the case in Figure 3, even
though each individual recipient may face a horizontal demand curve. In such a
scenario a subsidy that reduces each recipient's marginal cost of production will
reduce the world market price.
To summarize, from an economic point of view, it is far from certain that a
subsidy always lowers the price of the subsidized product. For a subsidy to pass
through to the price of the subsidized product, the subsidy must alter the recipient
firm's productive behavior, and the recipient firm must have market power in the
market for the subsidized product.
It is abundantly clear that subsidies that do pass through to the price of the
subsidized product are only a subset of the subsidies that are subject to regulation
under the SCM Agreement. Recall from earlier discussions that three requirements
must be met for a subsidy to be subject to the SCM Agreement: It must be a
financial contribution, confer a benefit, and be specific to a firm or industry or a
group of firms or industries.2 00 Under this definition of subsidies, what matters is
whether a subsidy "benefits" the recipient;20' whether the subsidy changes the
1 Note, however, that the subsidy has to be considered "specific" within the meaning of Article
2 of the SCM Agreement before it can be made subject to the SCM Agreement. See SCM Agreement,
supra note 41, art. 1.2.
200 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
201 Article 14 of the SCM Agreement provides the following guidelines for calculating the
amount of a subsidy in terms of its benefit to the recipient:
(a) government provision of equity capital shall not be considered as conferring a benefit,
unless the investment decision can be regarded as inconsistent with the usual investment
practice (including for the provision of risk capital) of private investors in the territory of that
Member;
(b) a loan by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless there is a
difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the govemment loan
and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan which the firm could
actually obtain on the market. In this case the benefit shall be the difference between these
two amounts;
(c) a loan guarantee by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, unless
there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the guarantee pays on a loan
guaranteed by the government and the amount that the firm would pay on a comparable
commercial loan absent the government guarantee. In this case the benefit shall be the
difference between these two amounts adjusted for any differences in fees;
(d) the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall not be
considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate
remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration. The adequacy
of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good
or service in question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, quality,
availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).
SCM Agreement, supra note 41, art. 14.
These guidelines generally employ a "market benchmark," comparing what the subsidy recipient pays
or receives under the subsidy program to what it would pay or receive under normal market conditions.
For analysis of the market benchmarks for identifying and measuring subsidies under the SCM
Agreement, see Zheng, Market Benchmark, supra note 12, at 16-18. See also Sykes, Questionable
Case, supra note 12, at 504.
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recipient firm's productive behavior and reduces the price of the subsidized product
is irrelevant.2 02 Therefore, from an economic point of view, it is simply wrong to
presume that all subsidies subject to the SCM Agreement pass through to prices in
all circumstances.
V. THE SUBSIDY PASS-THROUGH PRESUMPTION: INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES
Not only is the subsidy pass-through presumption economically wrong, but
it is also not consistently employed by the current subsidy regulation regime. As
noted above, the double counting controversy arises in part because the SCM
Agreement and U.S. countervailing duty law are silent as to whether and how to
take account of double counting for domestic subsidies. 203 To the extent that there
is no explicit guidance on this issue, attempts might be made to examine whether
the SCM Agreement and U.S. countervailing duty law embody implicit principles
that may inform the double counting analyses.204  In this Part, the Article
demonstrates that efforts to seek implicit guidance from the current subsidy
regulation regime would fail, because the SCM Agreement and U.S. countervailing
duty law are internally inconsistent as to the behavioral and price impacts of
subsidies. On one hand, proponents of the double counting hypothesis could point
to the SCM Agreement and U.S. countervailing duty law for requirements that
support the subsidy pass-through presumption. On the other hand, opponents of the
double counting hypothesis could point to the SCM Agreement and U.S.
countervailing duty law for requirements that reject the subsidy pass-through
presumption. Both sides would be correct in their own analysis, but neither side
would be correct in arguing that the law is solely on their side. The only conclusion
that could be drawn from these internal inquiries would be that the current subsidy
regulation regime is self-contradictory as to the behavioral and price impacts of
subsidies.
A. The "Injury" and "Adverse Effects" Requirements: Behavioral Impact of
Subsidies Required
First of all, the current subsidy regulation regime implicitly requires a
subsidy to have an impact on the productive behavior of the recipient firm before it
can be regulated. This can be seen from the "injury" requirement for the imposition
of countervailing duties and the "adverse effects" requirement for seeking
multilateral remedies against subsidies.
Under Article VI of GATT 1994, an importing country can impose
countervailing duties to offset a subsidy conferred by a foreign government only if
202 Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz call this approach the "benefit oriented" approach, as opposed to
the "cost-based" approach that would discipline subsidies only if they affect recipient firms' costs. See
Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 19-22.
203 See supra Part III.B.
204 In the DOC proceeding leading to DS379, China attempted this type of argument by claiming
that the presumption that a domestic subsidy lowers the export price is "the whole basis for imposing
countervailing duties." See CFS PAPER AD I&D MEMO, supra note 94, at 14. Apparently, the logic of
this argument is that if U.S. countervailing duty law implicitly embodies a general subsidy pass-through
presumption, then NME cases should not be subject to a separate subsidy pass-through analysis.
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the "effect of . .. subsidization . .. is such as to cause or threaten material injury to
an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment
of a domestic industry."205 Article 11 of the SCM Agreement provides that an
application for the imposition of countervailing duties should include sufficient
evidence of "injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994" and "a causal
link between the subsidized imports and the alleged injury."206 The SCM
Agreement further provides that in determining whether subsidized imports cause
injury, the relevant factors are "the volume of the subsidized imports and the effect
of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market for like products" and
"the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers of such
products." 207 Under these requirements, a subsidy is subject to regulation only if it
has the effects of causing the volume of exports to increase or the price in the
domestic market of the importing country to decrease, or both. These effects hinge
on the subsidy changing the productive behavior of the recipient firm. The injury
requirement, therefore, essentially requires a subsidy to have a behavioral impact
before it can be subject to regulation.
The WTO prong of the current subsidy regulation regime contains similar
requirements. The SCM Agreement classifies subsidies into two categories:
prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies.208 Prohibited subsidies refer to
subsidies contingent upon export performance or the use of domestic over imported
goods.209 When challenging prohibited subsidies before the WTO, a complainant is
not required to demonstrate any trade effects of such subsidies.210 This, however, is
not because the SCM Agreement does not consider prohibited subsidies to have
trade effects. To the contrary, a complainant is not required to demonstrate the
trade effects of prohibited subsidies because such subsidies are considered
inherently trade-distorting and therefore evidence of trade effects is not necessary.21'
For a complainant to challenge actionable subsidies, i.e., subsidies other
than prohibited subsidies, 212 the subsidies must cause "adverse effects" to the
interests of other WTO members.2 3 The "adverse effects" of a subsidy can be
established by demonstrating: (1) injury to the domestic industry of another WTO
205 GATT 1994, supra note 87, art. VI:6(a). The SCM Agreement adopts the same injury
requirement for the imposition of countervailing duties. Article 11 of the SCM Agreement provides
that an application for the imposition of countervailing duties should include sufficient evidence of
"injury within the meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994" and "a causal link between the subsidized
imports and the alleged injury." SCM Agreement, supra note 41, art. 11.2.
206 SCM Agreement, supra note 41, art. 11.2.
207 Id. art. 15.1.
208 See MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 375-84 (4th ed. 2013). The SCM Agreement originally included a third
category of subsidies-non-actionable subsidies-but that classification expired at the beginning of the
year 2000 pursuant to Article 31 of the SCM Agreement. Id at 375.
209 SCM Agreement, supra note 41, art. 3.1.
210 Under the SCM Agreement, a complainant is only required to provide evidence with regard to
"the existence and nature" of prohibited subsidies. See id. art. 4.2.
211 TREBILCOCK, HOWSE & ELIASON, supra note 208, at 376; see also Working Party on GATS
Rules, Report of the Meeting of 23 June 2004, T 8, S/WPGR/M/48 (July 20, 2004) ("[T]rade distortive
effects were inherent to export subsidies.").
212 The SCM Agreement does not provide a definition of "actionable subsidies"; it simply uses
the term "actionable subsidies" in the title of the part pertaining to subsidies other than prohibited
subsidies. See SCM Agreement, supra note 41, pt. Ill.
213 See id. arts. 5, 7.2.
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member, (2) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to
other WTO members under GATT 1994, or (3) serious prejudice to the interests of
another WTO member.214 With the exception of nullification or impairment of
benefits, all three methods of establishing adverse effects require a subsidy to have
a behavioral impact. First, as for injury to the domestic industry, the SCM
Agreement states that the term "is used in the same sense" as it is used in the
countervailing duty prong of the SCM Agreement,215 which, as discussed above,
requires a subsidy to have a behavioral impact. Second, as for nullification or
impairment of benefits, the SCM Agreement states that the term "is used in the
same sense as it is used in the relevant provisions of GATT 1994" and "the
existence of such nullification or impairment shall be established in accordance
with the practice of application of these provisions.26 Under GATT case law,
whether nullification or impairment of benefits under GATT 1994 requires a
showing of a noticeable change in trade flows depends on the nature of the benefit
in question.217 A noticeable change in trade flow is not required if the benefit in
question consists of "the protection of expectations on competitive conditions."2 8
However, the GATT and the WTO have yet to opine on what the nature of the
benefit under the SCM Agreement is and whether "nullification or impairment of
benefits" under the SCM Agreement requires a showing of a tangible trade effect.
It is uncertain, therefore, whether a subsidy is required to have a behavioral impact
before it can be considered to cause adverse effects through nullification or
impairment of benefits. Finally, as for serious prejudice, the SCM Agreement
provides that a subsidy may cause serious prejudice in four scenarios: (1) the
subsidy displaces or impedes the imports of a like product of another WTO member
into the market of the subsidizing country; (2) the subsidy displaces or impedes the
exports of a like product of another WTO member from a third country market; (3)
the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized
product as compared with the price of a like product of another WTO member in
the same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in
the same market; and (4) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market
share of the subsidizing country in a particular subsidized primary product or
commodity.2 9 Obviously, all of the four scenarios require the subsidy in question
to change the productive behavior of the recipient firm in terms of either output
level or price, or both.
In sum, the SCM Agreement requires a subsidy to cause injury or adverse
effects before it can be regulated. A logical extension of this requirement is that if a
subsidy has been made subject to the SCM Agreement, it should be presumed to
have caused injury or adverse effects-otherwise there would be no basis to
regulate the subsidy to begin with. For a subsidy to cause injury or adverse effects,
214 Id.
215 Id. art. 5(a) n.l 1.
216 Id. art. 5(b) n.12.
217 See Report of the Panel, EEC-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of
Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, 151 (Jan. 25, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86
(1991).
218 Id. See also Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, T5.1.9 (Jun. 17, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988).
219 Id. art. 6.3.
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it must have an impact on the productive behavior of the recipient firm. Therefore,
in this sense, the current subsidy regulation regime presumes subsidies brought
under its purview to have a behavioral impact.
B. The Identification and Measurement of Subsidies: Behavioral Impact of
Subsidies Irrelevant
While implicitly requiring subsidies to have a behavioral impact before
they can be regulated, the current subsidy regulation regime disregards the
behavioral impact of subsidies in identifying and measuring subsidies. As noted
earlier, what makes a subsidy prohibited or actionable under the SCM Agreement is
that it confers a benefit on the subsidy recipient, not that it alters the productive
behavior of the subsidy recipient.2 0 The benefit of a subsidy, in turn, is measured
by comparing what the subsidy recipient pays or receives under the subsidy
program to what it would pay or receive under normal market conditions.22 1 Under
this benefit-based definition of subsidies, the behavioral impact of a subsidy is
completely irrelevant to its identification and measurement.
In theory, the benefit-based definition of subsidies and the injury and
adverse effects requirements are not necessarily contradictory to each other. If the
effects of a subsidy could be reliably ascertained, the injury and adverse effects
requirements could be said to operate in conjunction with the benefit-based
definition of subsidies to narrow the scope of prohibited and actionable subsidies to
only those that cause injury or adverse effects. As discussed earlier, however, it is
next to impossible to reliably ascertain the effects of a specific subsidy program.222
As a result, subsidies that confer a benefit on their recipients but do not cause injury
or adverse effects to foreign producers may very well be classified as prohibited or
actionable subsidies under the SCM Agreement.
The difficulty of determining the effects of specific subsidy programs can
be seen from the lack of rigorous analyses by WTO dispute settlement panels and
the Appellate Body in cases brought under the WTO prong of the current subsidy
regulation regime. In US-Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), for example,
the WTO dispute settlement panel hearing the case had to resort to what it described
as "commonsense reasoning" and "drawing of inferences from conclusions
regarding the nature" of certain U.S. subsidies to Boeing to determine the price
223
effects of those subsidies. More troublingly, the WTO panel in that case even
relied on what U.S. officials said about the policy objectives of the U.S. subsidies
as a basis on which to infer the actual effects of those subsidies.224 In some cases,
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have engaged in more formal causation
analyses by examining how a subsidy might affect a recipient's marginal cost of
220 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
221 id.
222 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
223 See Report of the Panel, United States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
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production.225 But as discussed earlier, the impact of a subsidy on a recipient's
marginal cost of production could be theoretically ambiguous. 26  It is not
surprising, therefore, that many of the marginal-cost-of-production analyses by
WTO panels and the Appellate Body amount to little more than mere assertions.227
The inability to reliably ascertain the effects of specific subsidy programs
has sometimes forced WTO panels and the Appellate Body to group subsidies
together and examine their effects on an aggregated basis. The WTO panel in
US-Upland Cotton, for example, determined that "[w]e do not see the Article
6.3(c) reference to 'the effect of the subsidy' (in the singular, rather than the plural)
as meaning that a serious prejudice analysis of price suppression must clinically
isolate each individual subsidy and its effects."228 The panel further held that "[t]o
the extent a sufficient nexus with these exists among the subsidies at issue so that
their effects manifest themselves collectively, we believe that we may legitimately
treat them as a 'subsidy' and group them and their effects together."229 Under this
practice, a subsidy that has no behavioral impact may nonetheless be subject to
WTO regulation as long as other subsidies that are being investigated at the same
time happen to cause serious prejudice. In other words, once the effects of
subsidies are evaluated on an aggregated basis, whether a subsidy has a behavioral
impact will cease to be a necessary condition for the subsidy to be subject to WTO
regulation under the SCM Agreement.
That said, the WTO prong of the current subsidy regulation regime at least
endeavors, or pretends to endeavor, to ascertain the effects of specific subsidy
programs. That effort or pretense of effort has been abandoned under the
countervailing duty prong of the current subsidy regulation regime. Initially, under
Article VI:6(a) of GATT 1947, GATT contracting states were required to
demonstrate that "the effect of subsidization ... is such as to cause or threaten to
cause material injury. . . ."230 But in a legislative sleight of hand, the SCM
Agreement in 1994 substituted the "effects of subsidized imports" for the "effect of
subsidization" as the focus of material injury determinations in countervailing duty
proceedings. 231' The SCM Agreement does preserve one reference to the effects of
225 In EC-Large Civil Aircraft, for example, the WTO panel analyzed whether certain subsidies
granted by the European Communities and its member states to Airbus affected Airbus' pricing through
affecting its marginal cost of production. See Report of the Panel, European Unions and Certain
Member States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, TT 7.1997-.2024, WT/DS316/R
(Jun. 30, 2010) [hereinafter EC-Large Civil Aircraft].
226 See supra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
In EC-Large Civil Aircraft, for example, the United States argued that certain European
subsidies reduced Airbus' cost of capital and marginal cost of production, "thereby enabling Airbus to
be more flexible on price." See EC--Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 225, 1 7.2023. In rejecting the
U.S. arguments, the WTO panel held:
We do not understand there to be any dispute about whether better creditworthiness results in
a lower cost of capital. However, we are not convinced that this will necessarily translate
into a reduction in the marginal cost of production. The United States has provided very
little, if any, explanation for why it considers this relationship would hold.
Id.
228 Report of the Panel, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 1 7.1192, WT/DS267/R
(Sept. 8, 2004).
229 id.
230 GATT 1947, supra note 27, art. VI:6(a) (emphasis added).
231 Articles 15.1-15.4 of the SCM Agreement all refer to the effect of subsidized imports in laying
out the standards for material injury determinations. Article 15.1, for example, states:
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subsidies by requiring, under Article 15.5, that WTO members demonstrate that
"the subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury within
the meaning of this Agreement."23 But that reference, when interpreted in light of
footnote 47 to the SCM Agreement,233 could mean that a demonstration of the
effects of subsidized imports will be sufficient to establish the fact that the injury is
caused through the effects of subsidies.234 The distinction here between the "effects
of subsidies" and the "effects of subsidized imports" is crucial. When a
demonstration of the effects of subsidies is required, an investigating authority has
to demonstrate that it is the subsidies that cause the injury. But when only a
demonstration of the effects of subsidized imports is required, an investigating
authority need only demonstrate that the injury is caused by the imports under
countervailing duty investigation; exactly which subsidy causes the injury and
whether the injury is caused by subsidies at all will be irrelevant to the injury
determination.
Whatever the meaning of the reference to the "effects of subsidies" in
Article 15.5 of the SCM Agreement, that reference has vanished under national
countervailing duty laws. U.S. countervailing duty law, for example, only requires
a demonstration that injury is "by reason of imports."2 35 EU countervailing duty
law, for another example, only requires the examination of the effects of
"subsidized imports" in injury determinations.236
The elimination of the need to examine the effects of subsidies in
countervailing duty proceedings is most complete under U.S. countervailing duty
law: Not only has U.S. countervailing duty law omitted any references to the
effects of subsidies in injury determinations, but it has explicitly stated that "[t]he
administering authority is not required to consider the effect of the subsidy in
determining whether a subsidy exists . . . ."237 This provision was added by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act to repeal a 1993 ruling by a U.S.-Canada dispute
settlement panel that a government practice has to have an effect on the price or
output of the merchandise under investigation in order for the government practice
and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market for like products and (b)
the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers of such products.
SCM Agreement, supra note 41, art. 15.1 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
232 Id. art. 15.5 (emphasis added).
233 Footnote 47 is placed after the word "effects" in Article 15.5:
15.5. It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects47 of subsidies,
causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.
47. As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4.
Id. art. 15.5.
234 See MARK BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM 284 (2001).
But as Benitah pointed out, interpreting footnote 47 this way would render Article 15.5 redundant. Id
Benitah argued that an alternative interpretation of footnote 47 would require a demonstration of not
just the effects of subsidized imports as set forth under Articles 15.2 and 15.4, but also the effects of
subsidies. Id. at 285-86. Benitah acknowledged, however, that the latter interpretation would stretch
the literal meaning of footnote 47. Id. at 286.
235 See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2011).
236 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on Protection Against
Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Members of the European Community, art. 8, 1997 O.J. (L
288) 1.
237 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(C) (2011).
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to be considered a subsidy. 3 8  The Statement of Administrative Action
accompanying this provision clarified that this provision was intended to make
clear that "the new definition of subsidy [under the SCM Agreement and the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act] does not require that [the DOC] consider or
analyze the effect (including whether there is any effect at all) of a government
action on the price or output of the class or kind of merchandise under investigation
or review."239
U.S. countervailing duty law, therefore, suffers from a fundamental self-
contradiction: On one hand, a subsidy has to cause injury in order for it to be
countervailable, but on the other hand, the effects of a subsidy are not investigated
at all in countervailing duty proceedings and are irrelevant to the identification and
measurement of the subsidy anyway. Since injury determinations in U.S.
countervailing duty proceedings are made on the basis of the effects of subsidized
imports, not on the basis of the effects of specific subsidy programs, it may very
well be the case that a subsidy that has no behavioral impact is found to cause
injury.
This self-contradiction also plagues the WTO prong of the current subsidy
regulation regime, albeit to a lesser degree. As discussed above, the WTO prong of
the current subsidy regulation regime at least tries, or pretends to try, to ascertain
the effects of a subsidy before deternining whether the subsidy is subject to WTO
regulation. But given the difficulties with assessing the effects of specific subsidy
programs, and given the lack of rigorous analyses by WTO panels and the
Appellate Body of the effects of specific subsidy programs, it may still be the case
that a subsidy that has no behavioral impact will be found to cause adverse effects.
C. Upstream Subsidies: No Presumption ofSubsidy Pass-Through
Yet another example of the internal inconsistencies of the current subsidy
regulation regime regarding the behavioral impact of subsidies can be found in the
treatment of upstream subsidies. Under U.S. countervailing duty law, the term
"upstream subsidy" refers to a subsidy conferred on an input product that is used in
the manufacture or production of the merchandise that is the subject of a
countervailing duty investigation.240 To qualify as an upstream subsidy, a subsidy
must bestow a "competitive benefit" on the subject merchandise and must have a
significant effect on the cost of manufacturing or producing the subject
merchandise. 24 ' For example, if the merchandise that is subject to a countervailing
duty investigation is steel, then a subsidy conferred on the production of iron ores
will be an upstream subsidy if it bestows a "competitive benefit" on the steel
producer and if it has a significant effect on the cost of producing the steel.
Under U.S. countervailing duty law, an upstream subsidy confers a
competitive benefit on a downstream product if the price of the upstream product is
lower than the price that the downstream producer would otherwise pay for the
238 See URAA, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at
926 (1994).
239 id
240 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677-1(a)(1)(201 1).
241 Id. § 1677-l(a)(2)-(3).
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product in obtaining it from another seller in an arms-length transaction.242 To use
the above steel/iron ore example again, if the downstream steel producer pays $100
a ton for iron ores that received an upstream subsidy while it otherwise would have
to pay $150 a ton to obtain iron ores from a seller in an arms-length transaction,
then the upstream subsidy conferred on iron ores will be considered to bestow a
competitive benefit of $50 on the downstream steel product. If an upstream subsidy
is conferred, the DOC will be required to add the amount of the competitive benefit
conferred by the upstream subsidy on the downstream product to the amount of
countervailing duties imposed on the downstream product.2 43 Again, in the above
steel/iron ores example, the DOC will be required to add $50 to the amount of
countervailing duties imposed on the downstream steel product.
A key issue in the upstream subsidy analysis is what the DOC needs to do
to prove that an upstream subsidy "passes through" from the upstream producer to
the downstream producer. U.S. countervailing duty law provides that if the
upstream producer and the downstream producer are unrelated, then the DOC "shall
decide" that a competitive benefit is conferred by the upstream subsidy.24 In other
words, the DOC needs to definitively establish that an upstream subsidy passes
through to the downstream product; it could not simply presume that an upstream
subsidy will pass through.
The treatment of upstream subsidies under U.S. countervailing duty law
finds support in WTO case law concerning the issue. In United States-Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from
Canada, a WTO dispute settlement panel and the Appellate Body dealt with the
question of whether the DOC was required to conduct a subsidy pass-through
analysis when imposing countervailing duties on imports of softwood lumber
products from Canada to offset subsidies conferred on the harvesting of timber by
timber harvesters that sold raw logs to unrelated lumber producers.2 45  Both the
panel and the Appellate Body ruled that the definition of the term "countervailing
duty" in footnote 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement,2 46 as well as Article VI:3
of GATT 1994,247 requires a pass-through analysis. 248  Both the panel and the
242 Id. § 1677-l(b)(1).
243 Id. § 1677-1(c).
244 Id. § 1677-l(b)(1).
245 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States--Final Countervailing Duty Determination
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 123-66, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004)
[hereinafter DS257 AB Report]; Report of the Panel, United States-Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, %f 7.81-.99, WT/DS257/R
(Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter DS257 Panel Report].
246 Article 10 of the SCM Agreement reads as follows:
Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a countervailing duty36 on
any product of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of another Member is in
accordance with the provisions of Article VI of GATT 1994 and the terms of this Agreement.
Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated [footnote omitted]
and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Agreement on
Agriculture.
36. The term "countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the
purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production
or export of any merchandise, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994.
SCM Agreement, supra note 41, art. 10.
247 Article VI:3 of GATT 1994 provides:
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Appellate Body held that in the instant dispute, the DOC's failure to conduct a pass-
through analysis with respect to arms-length sales of logs by timber harvesters to
lumber producers violated these WTO rules.249
To some extent, the requirement for a definitive pass-through analysis for
upstream subsidies has also been read into the WTO prong of the subsidy regulation
regime. In United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Brazil challenged subsidies
allegedly conferred by the United States on producers, users and exporters of
upland cotton before the WTO.250 The United States argued that in determining
whether the alleged subsidies caused "serious prejudice" under Article 6.3(c) of the
SCM Agreement, the WTO dispute settlement panel failed to establish the extent to
which the benefit of certain subsidies paid to producers of raw cotton passed
through to processed cotton.25' The Appellate Body held that, since the requirement
in Article VI:3 of GATT 1994 and Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement that
countervailing duties imposed on a product be limited to the amount of the subsidy
accruing to that product has no parallel in Part III of the SCM Agreement, the need
for a pass-through analysis is "not critical" for an assessment of significant price
suppression under Article 6.3(c) in Part III of the SCM Agreement. 25 2 Nevertheless,
the Appellate Body held that a "subsidized product" must be identified for purposes
of determining price suppression under Article 6.3(c) and, to identify a "subsidized
product," it must be established that the upstream subsidy has flowed to the
downstream product.253
The requirement for a definitive pass-through analysis for upstream
subsidies means that investigating authorities and the WTO are prohibited from
relying on a presumption of subsidy pass-through when analyzing upstream
subsidies. Under this requirement, if an upstream producer receives a subsidy, the
producer could not be presumed to pass the subsidy along to an unrelated
downstream producer by charging a lower price than would be charged by a seller
in an arms-length transaction. Investigating authorities must affirmatively
determine that the upstream subsidy passes through to the price of the upstream
product.
No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of another contracting party in excess of an amount equal to the
estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the
manufacture, production or export of such product in the country of origin or exportation,
including any special subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. The term
"countervailing duty" shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of
offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture,
production or export of any merchandise.
GATT 1994, supra note 87, art. VI:3.
248 See DS257 Panel Report, supra note 245, 7.91; DS257 AB Report, supra note 245, 146.
249 See DS257 Panel Report, supra note 245, 1 7.99; DS257 AB Report, supra note 245, 146.
250 See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 1,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005).
251 Id. 470.
252 Id. 472.
253 Id. The Appellate Body held, however, that Article 6.3(c) does not require a precise
quantification of the upstream subsidy at issue because the remedy envisioned under Part III of the
SCM Agreement is the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of the adverse effects, not the
imposition of countervailing duties whose amount cannot be in excess of the amount of the subsidy. Id.
1 464.
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The treatment of upstream subsidies under U.S. countervailing duty law
directly contradicts the subsidy pass-through presumption that underlies the double
counting hypothesis. The double counting hypothesis states that when a producer
sells a subsidized product to an unrelated buyer, the presumption is that the seller
passes the subsidy along to the buyer by lowering the price of the subsidized
product. But when an upstream producer sells a subsidized product to an unrelated
downstream buyer, U.S. countervailing duty law makes no presumptions as to
whether the upstream producer will pass along the subsidy to the downstream
buyer. Seen in this light, the subsidy pass-through presumption underlying the
double counting hypothesis is firmly rejected by U.S. countervailing duty law,
albeit in a different context.
VI. THE CASE FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS OF THE CURRENT SUBSIDY
REGULATION REGIME
The foregoing discussions demonstrate that the double counting issue that
has entangled the current round of subsidy disputes is indeed a false issue, as the
subsidy pass-through presumption thought to give rise to double counting is
economically wrong and is not consistently employed by the current subsidy
regulation regime. In this Part, the Article argues that it is impossible to arrive at a
coherent, economically sensible solution to the double counting issue within the
framework of the current subsidy regulation regime. This Article further argues
that the problem with the double counting issue is indeed a problem with the
current subsidy regulation regime, which embraces conflicting rationales for
regulating subsidies in the first place. This Article renews the call for fundamental
reforms of the current subsidy regulation regime and proposes a blueprint for such
reforms.
A. The Impossibility of a Coherent Approach to the Double
Counting Controversy
As discussed earlier, whether a subsidy is double-counted in concurrent
NME antidumping and countervailing duty cases depends on whether the subsidy
passes through to the price of the subsidized product. Economic theory indicates
that the question of whether a subsidy passes through to the price of the subsidized
product is necessarily a factual one: It depends on whether the subsidy in question
alters the productive behavior of the recipient firm, and whether the recipient firm
has market power in the market for the subsidized product.2 54 It is wrong, therefore,
to simply presume a subsidy to pass through to price.
The economic fallacies of the subsidy pass-through presumption mean that
most, if not all, of the double counting analyses ventured so far are misguided. If a
subsidy does not necessarily pass through to the price of the subsidized product, it
is inappropriate to allocate to the investigating authority the burden to prove that
double counting does not occur, as the CIT and the Appellate Body did in GPX I
254 See supra Part IV.
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and DS379 respectively.255 Indeed, without the subsidy pass-through presumption,
double counting would not even have become an issue to begin with.
Therefore, the correct approach to double counting appears to be to require
parties arguing for the existence of double counting to bear the burden of factually
proving that a subsidy passes through to the price of the subsidized product before
an investigating authority is obligated to investigate the potential double counting
of subsidies. Without at least plausible evidence of subsidy pass-though, it seems
wrong to devote administrative and judicial resources to an issue that is at best
speculative.
The above approach would pose high hurdles for claims of double
counting. As discussed earlier, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to establish a
causal relationship between a specific subsidy program and a change in the price of
the subsidized product.256 If a party could somehow meet the burden of proving the
existence of double counting, the next challenge will be the calculation of the
magnitude of double counting. As illustrated in Figure 3 above, even if a subsidy
does pass through to price, it may not always reduce price one for one. The exact
magnitude of the subsidy pass-through will depend on the shapes and slopes of the
supply and demand curves for the product in question.25 But if both the existence
and magnitude of double counting could be established, the above approach would
require the investigating authority to adjust the amount of antidumping and/or
countervailing duties to take account of double counting.
However, as intuitive as it appears, the above approach would solicit a
greater problem than it solves. Requiring investigating authorities to take account
of double counting once the existence and magnitude of subsidy pass-through are
established would open the door to examining the effects of subsidies in
countervailing duty proceedings.258 But once the effects of subsidies begin to be
examined, it would be difficult to set a limit on that exercise. Specifically, if a
respondent could obtain a lower duty rate by demonstrating that a subsidy passes
through to price and therefore is double counted, should a respondent be allowed to
argue that a subsidy should not be countervailable if it could demonstrate that the
subsidy has no behavioral impact (or has no behavioral impact yet)? Logic would
require respondents to be given that option: After all, a subsidy that has no
behavioral impact (or has no behavioral impact yet) will not cause (or will not have
caused) injury, thus failing a prerequisite for the imposition of countervailing
duties. Therefore, if anything, the above approach to double counting would reveal
the self-contradictions of U.S. countervailing duty law: On one hand, U.S.
255 See supra notes 111, 133 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
257 See supra Figure 3. A separate question is who should have the burden to calculate the
magnitude of subsidy pass-through. Recall that in PL 112-99, the United States Congress allocated this
burden to the DOC. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
258 Technically, one might argue that the effects of subsidies are accounted for in antidumping
proceedings, not in countervailing duty proceedings, since the amount of subsidy pass-through would
be subtracted from the amount of antidumping duties, not from the amount of countervailing duties.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. This distinction, however, is purely formalistic. For a
respondent firm facing concurrent antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, what matters is
the combined antidumping and countervailing duty rate. It is immaterial whether the reduction in the
combined duty rate is due to a reduction in the antidumping duty rate or due to a reduction in the
countervailing duty rate; in either scenario it is the subsidy pass-through that results in the lower duty
rate.
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countervailing duty law requires a subsidy to cause injury, but on the other hand, it
does not require a demonstration of the effects of a subsidy and countervails a
subsidy regardless of its behavioral impact. Because of these self-contradictions, it
is simply impossible to arrive at a coherent solution to the double counting issue
within the framework of the current subsidy regulation regime.
B. Conflicting Rationales for Subsidy Regulation
The foregoing analyses beg the more important question of why the current
subsidy regulation regime is internally inconsistent as to the behavioral impact of
subsidies. As this Article will discuss below, the answer to that question could be
because the current subsidy regulation regime embraces two conflicting rationales
for subsidy regulation, one based on economic efficiency and one based on the
protection of entitlements.
1. The Efficiency Rationale
According to the efficiency rationale for subsidy regulation, subsidies need
to be regulated because they distort resource allocation and reduce economic
efficiency. The original framework of the GATT, for example, treats subsidies as a
"distortion" that creates a disparity between the actual costs of producing a
particular good and those that are borne by the firm producing it.259 This conception
of subsidies as a distortion was formally recognized by the DOC, which, in Carbon
Steel Wire Rod from Poland in 1984, defined a subsidy as "any action that distorts
or subverts the market process, results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging
inefficient production and lessening world wealth."260 In 1989, in the preamble to
its newly proposed countervailing duty regulations, the DOC fully embraced this
efficiency rationale as the whole basis of its countervailing duty regulations.261
The efficiency rationale could explain why the SCM Agreement regulates
subsidies regardless of their behavioral impact. The efficiency rationale posits that
since subsidies reduce overall economic efficiency, other countries should be
allowed to adopt countervailing measures for the benefit of the collective welfare of
the world even if the subsidies do not have an adverse impact on their own
interests.262 The purpose of subsidy regulation, according to the efficiency
259 Schwartz & Harper, supra note 12, at 833 (citing W. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE ITO CHARTER AND THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 214-15 (1950); KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 132 (1970)).
260 See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland, supra note 69, at 19,375.
261 See Countervailing Duties: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public
Comments, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,366, 23,367 (May 31, 1989) ("Conceptually, the [countervailing duty]
regulations are based upon the economic model articulated by the Department in its final
determination[] in. . . Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland. . . .").
262 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 282 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the argument that international
disciplines on subsidies are better justified from a worldwide perspective).
2013 469
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
rationale, is not to remedy the adverse consequences of subsidies but to deter the
use of subsidies in the first place.263
The current subsidy regulation regime, however, could not be fully
reconciled with the efficiency rationale. From a theoretical point of view, not all
subsidies distort the market process and reduce economic efficiency; many
subsidies indeed "correct" the market process and enhance economic efficiency.264
A subsidy may enhance economic efficiency when it corrects "market failures," a
situation in which the actual price differs from the socially optimal price. 265 The
definition of the term "subsidies" under the SCM Agreement, however, makes no
distinction between subsidies that distort the market process and subsidies that
correct the market process, belying any claim that the purpose of subsidy regulation
under the SCM Agreement is to enhance efficiency.2 66
2. The Entitlement Rationale
In search of an alternative rationale for subsidy regulation, some scholars
posited that the purpose of subsidy regulation is to protect the "entitlements" of the
producers of the importing countries.26 7 Under this entitlement rationale for subsidy
regulation, governments are free to grant subsidies in ways they see fit, but other
countries will be allowed to take countervailing measures to offset those subsidies
that harm the entitlements of their own producers.26 8 Unlike the efficiency
rationale, which emphasizes deterrence, the entitlement rationale emphasizes the
neutralization of the adverse effects of subsidies.269 John Jackson called this motive
for applying countervailing measures "parochial or selfish," but recognized that this
motive in the long run tends to coincidentally inhibit a practice that reduces world
welfare.270
263 See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 19-20 (describing the deterrence rationale of
the countervailing duty law).
264 Schwartz & Harper, supra note 12, at 833. Schwartz and Harper went as far as arguing that
"perhaps all" subsidies can be defended as a correction, rather than a distortion, of the market process.
Id
265 WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2006: ExPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN SUBSIDIES, TRADE
AND THE WTO 58 (2006); see also Schwartz & Harper, supra note 12, at 833-34 ("The need for
correction is said to derive from the existence of 'externalities,' that is, costs or benefits that are borne
or reaped by nonparties to a transaction and are not therefore taken into account in the market
process.").
266 See Sykes, A Critique, supra note 12, at 699; see also Diamond, Economic and Financial
Principles, supra note 12, at 532.
267 Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz first used the term "entitlement" to describe the interests of U.S.
producers in being protected from injury caused by foreign subsidies:
We assume that American firms are entitled to that domestic market outcome which would
have resulted from a "fair," competitive process, by which is meant one which has not been
"manipulated" by foreign government subsidization. The idea then is to restore competition
in the American market to its "but for" state by neutralizing the effect of the subsidy.
Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 18-19. See also Diamond, Economic Foundations, supra
note 12, at 780-82. Simon Lester also formulated an approach to the countervailing law that resembles
the entitlement approach. See generally Lester, supra note 12 (arguing that a possible purpose of the
multilateral subsidy regulation regime is to fight protectionist subsidies).
268 See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 20-23 (describing the cost-based approach
to the countervailing duty law).
269 See id
270 See JACKSON, supra note 262, at 282.
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To some extent, the injury and adverse effects requirements under the
current subsidy regulation regime reflect the entitlement rationale: A subsidy, no
matter how detrimental it may be to the welfare of the country that grants the
subsidy, will not be subject to regulation under the SCM Agreement unless it
affects the entitlements of producers in other countries. As discussed earlier,
however, the injury and adverse effects requirements alone do not narrow the scope
of subsidies that are subject to regulation, as it is practically impossible to establish
causal relationships between specific subsidy programs and injury or adverse
effects. 27 To fully reflect the entitlement rationale, the definition of subsidies must
be changed so that a subsidy that has no behavioral impact and therefore does not
affect the entitlements of foreign producers will not be considered a subsidy in the
first place. Proponents of the entitlement rationale themselves readily acknowledge
that the current subsidy regulation regime is not fully consistent with the
entitlement rationale.2 72
The current subsidy regulation regime could be described as a paradoxical
amalgam of the efficiency rationale and the entitlement rationale.273 On one hand, it
reflects the efficiency rationale because subsidies are identified and measured
regardless of their behavioral impact.274  On the other hand, it reflects the
entitlement rationale because conceptually, subsidies are required to cause injury or
adverse effects before they may be subject to regulation.275 The tension between
these two rationales underlies the internal inconsistencies of the current subsidy
regulation regime as to the behavioral impact of subsidies and makes it impossible
to have a coherent solution to the double counting issue.27 6
C. A Renewed Call for a Country-Specific Safeguard
The self-contradictions of the current subsidy regulation regime as revealed
by the double counting controversy add urgency to the need to reexamine the
fundamental purpose of subsidy regulation and ways to reform the current subsidy
regulation regime. Below, this Article concurs with the current literature that the
case for subsidy regulation in general is questionable. It then renews the call for
fundamental reforms of the current subsidy regulation regime by replacing the
countervailing duty prong of the regime with a new trade remedy instrument-a
country-specific safeguard-that this author proposed in another article. This
Article argues that the country-specific safeguard represents a politically feasible
improvement over the status quo and also solves the double counting problem.
271 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
272 See Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles, supra note 12, at 533-65 (arguing that
U.S. countervailing duty rules are inconsistent with the entitlement rationale); Goetz, Granet &
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 28 (noting that the benefit-oriented subsidy definition is wholly inconsistent
with the entitlement rationale).
273 Goetz, Granet, and Schwartz first pointed out the "basic tension" between the efficiency
rationale and the entitlement rationale. See Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 27.
274 See supra Part V.B.
275 See supra Part V.A.
276 See supra Part VIA.
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1. The Questionable Case for Subsidy Regulation
As discussed above, efforts to justify the current subsidy regulation regime
under certain normative principles have been unsuccessful, as neither of the two
main candidates-the efficiency rationale and the entitlement rationale-is fully
consistent with the current subsidy regulation regime. But questions remain as to
whether the current subsidy regulation regime could be reconfigured in accordance
with the efficiency or entitlement principle. As shall become clear below, the
answer to those questions is "no."
First of all, it is impracticable to reconfigure the SCM Agreement in
accordance with the efficiency rationale. Such reconfiguration would require a
regulatory scheme that regulates only inefficient subsidies, not efficient subsidies.
Scholars have outlined several obstacles to such a reconfiguration. First, there is no
international consensus as to what subsidies are efficient and what subsidies are
inefficient.277 Second, even if an international consensus on efficient subsidies
could be reached, the "haphazard and uncoordinated" imposition of countervailing
duties will yield "little systematic deterrent effect." 278  Finally, that a subsidy
enhances efficiency conceptually does not preclude the possibility that a
government may over-remedy the market failure that the subsidy is intended to
remedy, and it is practically impossible for investigating authorities to gather all the
information necessary for determining whether a government is subsidizing by the
correct amount.279
Similarly, it is impracticable to reconfigure the current subsidy regulation
regime in accordance with the entitlement rationale. Such reconfiguration would
require the regulation of only subsidies that have a behavioral impact. Identifying
the behavioral impact of subsidies, however, is not always easy. Proponents of the
entitlement rationale themselves acknowledge that the impact of certain subsidies
on recipient firms' marginal costs of production is theoretically ambiguous 280 and
the process for separating out the behavioral impact of a subsidy in a specific
jurisdiction is "costl[y]" and "error-prone."281 In addition, requiring an analysis of
the behavioral impact of subsidies in every case would undoubtedly result in a
subsidy regulation regime that is too unwieldy.282
Besides the efficiency and entitlement rationales, scholars have considered,
but rejected, several other possible objectives of across-the-board subsidy
277 Sykes, A Critique, supra note 12, at 699.
278 Id See also Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles, supra note 12, at 533 ("[T]otal
deterrence would be difficult to achieve given the nature of countervailing duties."); Sykes, An
Economic Perspective, supra note 12, at 200-01.
279 See Zheng, Market Benchmark, supra note 12, at 47-48.
280 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
281 Goetz, Granet & Schwartz, supra note 12, at 26.
282 Indeed, in the early 1990s, respondents in a countervailing duty investigation proposed a test
that would make a subsidy countervailable only if the subsidy lowers producers' marginal costs and
causes a net economic effect on producers' output or prices. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570, 22,604-05 (Dep't of Commerce May 28, 1992) (final
determination). The DOC rejected this proposal, arguing that "[from a practical perspective,
Respondents' thesis would push the Department into a complex causation analysis in every case and for
every type of countervailable subsidy, including all the usual direct subsidies that the Department
analyzes." Id. at 22,605. The DOC pointed out that "it would be difficult" to show a causal link
between the receipt of a subsidy and changes in the productive behavior of a subsidy recipient. Id.
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disciplines. Scholars have acknowledged that subsidy disciplines aimed at
protecting the expectations of market access created by trade agreements might be
legitimate, but have expressed doubts that additional, across-the-board subsidy
disciplines are necessary.283 Merit Janow, Robert Staiger, and Kyle Bagwell argued
that across-the-board disciplines on subsidies may be undesirable because they
hinder the ability of trading nations to pursue nonprotectionist objectives and make
them reluctant to enter trade agreements in the first place.84 Alan Sykes
hypothesized that across-the-board subsidy disciplines might serve several other
objectives, including the promotion of free trade, the prevention of competitive
subsidization, and the avoidance of time-inconsistency problems faced by
governments in their political interaction with domestic industries.2 " He concluded,
however, that the WTO subsidy rules do not accomplish those objectives
successfully because of the inability of the WTO rules to identify subsidization and
to distinguish undesirable from desirable subsidies. 286
In addition to the lack of defensible rationales, the case for subsidy
regulation is questionable particularly because a major pillar of the current subsidy
regulation regime-the imposition of countervailing duties-as dubious welfare
consequences at best. As Alan Sykes pointed out, under conditions of perfect
competition, a subsidy will enhance the welfare of an importing country and the
imposition of countervailing duties will often reduce the welfare of the importing
country.287 Although the imposition of countervailing duties may have positive
effects on the welfare of the importing country when subsidized imports cause
sustained unemployment or adjustment costs in the importing country, the existing
countervailing duty laws "are poorly suited to identify the circumstances in which
the imposition of a duty might be appropriate for these purposes."8 Similarly,
when the product market departs from conditions of perfection competition, the
imposition of countervailing duties may enhance the welfare of an importing
country if foreign governments use subsidies to finance the predatory campaigns of
their producers289 or use subsidies to seek strategic advantages for their producers.29 0
But as Sykes analyzed, existing countervailing duty laws are not properly tailored
to counter those subsidies. 291' For these reasons, Sykes argued that "abolition of the
countervailing duty laws might best serve the national economic interest."29 2
283 See Sykes, Questionable Case, supra note 12, at 496-97.
284 Merit E. Janow & Robert W. Staiger, U.S-Export Restraints, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF
2001 (Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003); Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Will
International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AM. ECON. REv. 877-95
(2006).
285 See Sykes, Questionable Case, supra note 12, at 498-501.
286 Id. at 501-20.
287 See Sykes, An Economic Perspective, supra note 12, at 214.
288 Id. at 229.
289 See Schwartz & Harper, supra note 12, at 834-35; J. A. Ordover, A. 0. Sykes & R. D. Willig,
Unfair International Trade Practices, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'LL. & POL. 323, 332 (1983).
290 This justification for trade barriers such as countervailing duties was advanced by scholars
subscribing to the "strategic trade policy" theories. See Sykes, An Economic Perspective, supra note
12, at 250-51 n.182.
291 See id at 241-56.
292 Id at 263.
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Similarly, Warren Schwartz argued that "no convincing case can be made for
having a countervailing duty law." 293
2. A Renewed Call for a Country-Specific Safeguard
Despite doubtful justifications for subsidy regulation in general and
countervailing duty laws in particular, a completely laissez-faire approach to
subsidy regulation would appear to be politically unfeasible. 294 One possible way of
reforming the current subsidy regulation regime, however, would be to create a new
trade remedy instrument to replace the countervailing duty prong of the current
subsidy regulation regime. As this Article will argue below, the new trade remedy
instrument will put subsidy regulation on a firmer intellectual foundation, will be
politically feasible, and, incidentally, will solve the double counting problem.
In a previous article, this author proposed to replace antidumping and
countervailing duties with a country-specific safeguard-a new trade remedy
instrument that allows an importing country to impose additional duties on imports
on a country-by-country basis upon a showing that the imports cause serious injury
to the domestic industries of the importing country.295 Unlike antidumping duties
and countervailing duties, the country-specific safeguard would not inquire into the
fairness of the underlying trade practices, be they dumping or subsidies. Instead, it
would focus completely on injury caused by imports and assesses the injury under
an elevated "serious injury" standard.296 Since the country-specific safeguard would
not have an "unfair trade" component, the amount of additional duties that could be
levied under the country-specific safeguard would have nothing to do with the
existence and magnitude of unfair trade practices, be they dumping or subsidies.
Instead, the amount of additional duties under the country-specific safeguard would
be determined in a process in which all constituents whose interests would be
affected by the safeguard could seek bargains and compromises.297 The country-
specific safeguard differs materially from the global safeguard authorized under
current WTO rules in that it requires neither nondiscrimination nor compensation.299
This author originally proposed the above country-specific safeguard to
replace antidumping duties, and argued that countervailing duties should be
subsumed under the country-specific safeguard as well because the country-specific
293 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 304. See also Schwartz & Harper, supra note 12. But see
Barcelo, supra note 12 (advocating the use of countervailing duties to counteract export subsidies as
well as certain targeted domestic subsidies).
294 Scholars advocating the abolition of countervailing duty laws themselves acknowledge that
their proposal might be unlikely to succeed. See, e.g., Sykes, Economic Foundations, supra note 12, at
263.
295 Wentong Zheng, Reforming Trade Remedies, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 151, 158 (2012)
[hereinafter Zheng, Trade Remedies].
296 The "serious injury" standard under the proposed country-specific safeguard would require
that imports be a substantial cause of a significant amount of injury. See id at 183-86.
297 Id at 189-90. The political nature of the determination of duty levels under the country-
specific safeguard is aimed at remedying the "democracy deficit" in the trade remedy process, whereby
antidumping and countervailing duty rates are set using mechanical formulas without taking into
account the impact of the duties on constituents. For discussions of the democracy deficit in the
context of antidumping, see id. at 176-81.
298 See id. at 186-88.
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safeguard would have addressed injury caused by all sources, including subsidies. 299
But in light of the foundational problems of the current subsidy regulation regime
as discussed above, replacing the countervailing duty prong of the regime with the
country-specific safeguard has normative justifications as well. First and foremost,
the country-specific safeguard is no longer about subsidies, thus obviating the need
to determine what subsidies should be regulated and what subsidies should not. As
a result, the country-specific safeguard would not face the difficult conceptual
issues that have beset the current subsidy regulation regime as to the behavioral
impact of subsidies." Second, the country-specific safeguard can be better justified
on efficiency grounds than countervailing duties. That is because when import
duties do enhance the welfare of an importing country, they enhance the welfare of
the importing country whenever there is increased import competition, regardless of
whether the increased import competition results from subsidies.30' Therefore, a
policy response that is not conditioned on the existence of subsidies makes more
policy sense than countervailing duties.302
Admittedly, the country-specific safeguard would preserve the ability of
importing countries to impose additional duties, and that might have adverse
welfare consequences under certain circumstances.303 That, however, does not
weaken the case for the country-specific safeguard, since a complete abolitionist
approach, which may be ideal theoretically, would be politically unfeasible. By
contrast, the country-specific safeguard leaves domestic industries an effective trade
remedy instrument that may be invoked in circumstances warranting protection.
With its inquiries completely untethered from subsidies, the country-specific
safeguard is as close to a complete abolition of countervailing duties as is possible.
Furthermore, given that countries always face pressures to protect domestic
industries,30 s the country-specific safeguard may enhance welfare ex ante by
encouraging countries that otherwise would not be willing to undertake trade
concessions to enter into free trade agreements.306
To be sure, the country-specific safeguard does not offer a complete fix of
the current subsidy regulation regime. It would only replace the countervailing
duty prong of the regime, but would leave the WTO prong of the regime intact.
Under the country-specific safeguard, the WTO prong of the current subsidy
regulation regime would continue to face the difficult problem of ascertaining the
effects of specific subsidy programs-a problem that would persist short of a
complete abolition of subsidy regulation of any sorts.
That said, one problem that the country-specific safeguard would be able to
solve is the double counting problem. The double counting problem would not
299 See id at 203-04.
300 See supra Part VI.B.
301 See Sykes, An Economic Perspective, supra note 12, at 237.
302 See id. at 237-38.
303 For example, the imposition of additional duties will often reduce the welfare of the
importing country under conditions of perfect competition. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
3 See Zheng, Trade Remedies, supra note 295, at 194-95.
30s See Chad P. Bown, Why Are Safeguards Under the WTO So Unpopular?, I WORLD TRADE
REV. 47,49 (2002).
306 This is the "safety valve" argument for temporary protection mechanisms. See Zheng, Trade
Remedies, supra note 295, at 163-67.
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even arise under the country-specific safeguard, because the amount of additional
duties under the country-specific safeguard would not be tied in any way to the
magnitude of dumping or subsidies. Unlike the approach called for under the
current subsidy regulation regime,307 the country-specific safeguard represents a
coherent, economically sensible solution to the double counting controversy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Subsidy regulation is in a precarious state. While it has been so ever since
the conception of the current subsidy regulation regime, the recent double counting
controversy between the United States and China has threatened the mere
functionality of the current regime. This Article argues that the double counting
controversy reveals the self-contradictions of the current subsidy regulation regime
as to the fundamental question of why subsidies need to be regulated. These self-
contradictions make it impossible to devise a coherent solution to the double
counting problem within the framework of the current subsidy regulation regime
and sharpen the need for fundamental reforms of the current regime. As a first step
towards such reforms, this Article proposes to replace countervailing duties with a
country-specific safeguard, which this Article argues will solve the double counting
problem and, more importantly, help restore the intellectual foundation of the
current subsidy regulation regime.
307 See supra Part VI.A.
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